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The point of proper accommodation between the meting 
out of justice and the performance of military 
operations—which involved not only the fighting, but 
also the winning of wars—is one which no one has 
discovered.  I do not know of any expert on the subject—
military or civilian—who can be said to have the perfect 
solution.1 
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I. Introduction 
 
Nearly three million servicemembers are subject to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a comprehensive statutory framework 
for investigating and prosecuting the offenses it defines. The UCMJ was 
enacted in 1950 as a response to concerns about the existing Articles of 
War.2 In enacting the UCMJ, Congress struggled to balance the need for 
the commander to maintain discipline within the ranks against the belief 
that the military justice system could be made fairer, to protect the rights 
of servicemembers against the arbitrary actions of commanders. The 
final product could be considered a compromise.   
 
The UCMJ replaced the Articles of War, which had governed 
military justice since 1775. It was designed to provide a fair system of 
procedures and substantive rules to oversee the administration of justice 
in the ranks, to the end of promoting discipline. The commander 
remained an integral part of the military justice structure. But the Code 
expanded due process protections to servicemembers and created a three-
judge civilian court to review court-martial convictions. Congress has 
amended the UCMJ many times, sometimes to favor the prosecution of 
offenses and at other times to expand the protections to the accused.3 
 
                                                                                                             
1 Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 1, Wash. D.C., March 7, 1949 (Index 
and Legislative History, Uniform Code of Military Justice 597 (1950)). 
2 A number of commentators have written on the history and background of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). See, e.g., ROBINSON O. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN 
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1956); BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES 
SNEDEKER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF COURTS-MARTIAL (1954); Walter T. Cox, The Army, 
The Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(1987) (presenting an overview of development of military justice in the United States 
and the applicability of the Constitution to various rules and practices); Major Gerald F. 
Crump, Part II: A History of the Structure of Military Justice in the United States, 1921-
1966, 17 A.F. L. REV. 55 (Fall 1975) (presenting brief overview of the military justice 
developments from the period following World War I until the period preceding the 
changes to the system in the 1968 changes to the UCMJ and the 1969 Manual for Courts-
Martial (MCM)); Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953) (transcribing part of symposium on military justice, 
presenting an overview of the 1950 UCMJ and proposals leading to its passage); David 
A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 129 (1980). 
3 See, e.g., Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968); Major Howard H. Hoege 
III, “Overshift”: The Unconstitutional Double Burden Shift on Affirmative Defenses in 
the New Article 120, ARMY LAW., May 2007, at 2, 4 (describing Congress’s effort to 
reverse the burden of proof on consent in sexual assault cases). 
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The military justice system has been described as a “rough form of 
justice,”4 a system providing more rights than its civilian counterparts,5 a 
system of “drumhead justice,”6 a system incapable of dispensing justice,7 
an evolving system,8 a system that has been civilianized,9 a system in 
need of modernization,10 and a system in search of respect.11 However 
one describes or views the system, there has always been, and will 
always be, a debate over the exact purpose and function of the military 
justice system.  
 
How one describes the system’s chief function may depend on what 
themes or concepts take the fore.  The poles—as they always have 
been—are two: justice and discipline. These two values are often in 
competition with each other.12 In that competition rests a conundrum that 
is not easily answered or solved.  How do you fit together the two 
                                                 
4 See United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904, 918 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(noting that traditionally military justice has been a rough form of justice). 
5 See Lieutenant Homer E. Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: 
Advantages Over a Civilian Defendant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105 (1970), reprinted at 51 MIL. 
L. REV. 1 (1971); Robert Poydasheff & William K. Suter, Military Justice? Definitely!, 
49 TUL. L. REV. 588 (1975). 
6 See, e.g., Robinson O. Everett, The New Look in Military Justice, 1973 DUKE L.J. 648 
(1973) (responding to allegations of “drumhead justice” in the military). 
7 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
8 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2; Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the 
Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 440 (1994) (noting that like other 
divisions of the government, the military justice system has evolved). 
9 See, e.g., Delmar Karlen, Civilianization of Military Justice: Good or Bad, 60 MIL. L. 
REV. 113 (1973) (arguing against blind application of civilian system to military justice); 
Edward F. Sherman, Civilianization of Military Justice, 22 MAINE L. REV. 3 (1970) 
(describing how system has been civilianized through the years). 
10 See, e.g., Kevin J. Barry, Modernizing the Manual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making 
Process: A Work in Progress, 165 MIL. L. REV. 237 (2000) (offering suggestions for 
modernizing the procedures for amending the MCM; Gregory E. Maggs, Cautious 
Skepticism About the Benefit of Adding More Formalities to the Manual for Courts-
Martial Rule-Making Process: A Response to Captain Kevin J. Barry, 166 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(2000); Kevin J. Barry, A Reply to Captain Gregory E. Maggs’s ‘Cautious Skepticism’ 
Regarding Recommendations to Modernize the Manual for Courts-Martial Rule-Making 
Process, 166 MIL. L. REV. 37 (2000). 
11 David A. Schlueter, Military Justice in the 1990s: A Legal System in Search of Respect, 
133 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing features of military justice system that typically 
draw criticism). 
12 See, e.g., General William C. Westmoreland & General George S. Prugh, Judges in 
Command: The Judicialized Uniform Code of Military Justice in Combat, 3 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1980) (“A second problem for military codes is to identify and adopt 
those procedures which ensure fairness and ‘due process’ while preserving the ability of 
the forces to achieve their mission. This brings into conflict the commander's 
responsibility for mission accomplishment and the serviceman's rights.”). 
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competing values of justice and discipline? Should one predominate? If 
so, which one?  
 
Historically, it was assumed that the primary purpose of military 
justice was to enforce good order and discipline. The Articles of War, the 
predecessor to the UCMJ,13 recognized the commander’s broad authority 
to prosecute and punish any servicemember accused of an offense. 
Punishment was generally swift and sure and was sometimes harsh or 
arbitrary.14 The “justice” component—which in the early days of the 
military justice system was much less than today’s system—required the 
commander to provide basic due process while enforcing discipline.15  
Over time, the system has evolved. In many ways its evolution has 
reflected the expansion of individual rights in the civilian criminal justice 
systems.16  
 
The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) lists the purposes of 
“military law” and places justice first: 
 
3. Nature and purpose of military law. 
 
Military law consists of the statutes governing the 
military establishment and regulations issued thereunder, 
the constitutional powers of the President and 
regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent authority 
of military commanders. Military law includes 
jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and the 
jurisdiction exercised by commanders with respect to 
nonjudicial punishment. The purpose of military law is 
to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order 
and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency 
and effectiveness in the military establishment, and 
thereby to strengthen the national security of the United 
States.17 
                                                 
13 The Continental Congress enacted the original Articles of War in 1775. Through the 
years they were amended until the UCMJ finally replaced them in 1950. 
14 See United States v. McCarty, 29 C.M.R. 757, 760–61 (C.G.B.R. 1960) (noting 
severity of punishments during World War II and that sometimes there would be 
proposals to discipline court members for adjudging inadequate sentences); WILLIAM 
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 567 (2d ed. 1920 Reprint). 
15 Schlueter, supra note 2, at 145–50 (discussing protections for servicemembers subject 
to court-martial). 
16 Id. at 165 (noting due process developments reflecting extant views of justice). 
17 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pmbl. (2012) [hereinafter MCM]. 
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Notwithstanding this language in the MCM, there is an ongoing 
debate over the relationship between justice and discipline the military. 
This article explores that debate.  
 
Part II provides a brief summary of how the military justice system 
works, as a prelude to identifying the elements of the debate. Part III 
explores the various thematic approaches to the military justice 
conundrum. Those themes are sometimes in competition and sometimes 
complementary. They reflect the views of courts and commentators that 
have addressed the conundrum. Part IV discusses an approach to the 
conundrum by drawing from similar analyses of civilian criminal justice 
systems, which recognize the debate over whether a criminal justice 
system should reflect a crime control model or a due process model. Part 
V attempts to resolve the conundrum using a “primary purpose” analysis 
of the military justice system. Finally, Part VI offers some 
recommendations for solving the conundrum. 
 
 
II. Overview of the Military Justice System 
 
Before addressing in more detail the debate over the relationship 
between justice and discipline, it is important briefly to review how the 
military justice system works. 
 
 
A. Pretrial Procedures 
 
The statutory framework for military justice is the UCMJ. Article 36 
provides that the President may adopt procedures for the conduct of 
courts-martial.18 Those procedures are spelled out in the MCM. In 
addition, the Department of Defense, the service secretaries, and 
commanders may promulgate regulations to provide additional guidance. 
 
Courts-martial, which are only temporary tribunals,19 are created to 
determine the guilt or innocence of persons accused of committing 
offenses while subject to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces.  Some 
                                                 
18 UCMJ art. 36 (2012). 
19 McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 63 (1902). 
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would argue that they are designed to enforce discipline and others, to 
ensure that justice is done.20 
 
Currently, a commander convenes a court-martial to hear a specific 
case.21 It is not a part of the federal judiciary. However, the Supreme 
Court of the United States may ultimately review a military conviction.22 
In some points, the court-martial provides greater safeguards than its 
civilian counterparts do. A brief survey of current practice demonstrates 
this point.  
 
Before swearing to and preferring court-martial charges, a 
commander is responsible for conducting a thorough and impartial 
inquiry into the charged offenses.23 This almost always involves 
obtaining legal advice from a judge advocate.24 During that investigation, 
an accused is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment vis-a-
vis searches and seizures,25 the privilege against self-incrimination as 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 of the UCMJ,26 and 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, at a pretrial lineup.  
These constitutional protections are implemented not only by case law, 
which has concluded that they extend to servicemembers, but by the 
Military Rules of Evidence (MRE).27  
                                                 
20 See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 
1-1 (8th ed. 2012). 
21 See UCMJ arts. 22–24 (2012) (designating those with power to convene general, 
special, and summary courts-martial); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 504 (providing 
procedure for convening court-martial). The UCMJ provides that the President of the 
United States and a Service Secretary may convene a general court-martial. UCMJ art. 
24(a), (2012). 
22 UCMJ art. 67(h) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012). See generally Andrew Effron, 
Supreme Court of Review of Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals: The Legislative 
Background, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1985, at 59 (reviewing the Military Justice Act, which 
placed the Court of Military Appeals directly under the U.S. Supreme Court’s review); 
Bennett Boskey & Eugene Grossman, The Supreme Court’s New Certiorari Jurisdiction 
Over Military Appeals, 102 F.R.D. 329, 105 S. Ct. at XCII (1984) (discussing the 
Military Justice Act and the resulting certiorari jurisdiction the Supreme Court has over 
military appeals). 
23 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1205. 
24 UCMJ art. 37 (2012) (listing the requirement that before convening a general court-
martial the convening authority must consider the advice of the staff judge advocate). 
This is generally referred to as the “pretrial advice.”   
25 MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 311–21. 
26 UCMJ art. 31 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 301–05. 
27 See MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 301 (noting the privilege against self-
incrimination); id. MIL. R. EVID. 304 (listing the procedures for determining admissibility 
of accused’s statements); id. MIL. R. EVID. 305 (stating the Article 31(b) warnings and 
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The commander has broad discretion in deciding how to dispose of 
misconduct. First, the commander may decide that under the 
circumstances simply counseling the servicemember or issuing a 
reprimand is sufficient.28 Second, the commander may decide to begin 
administrative proceedings to discharge the servicemember.29 Third, the 
commander may decide to impose nonjudicial punishment. Under this 
third option, which is intended to be used for “minor” offenses, the 
commander decides whether the servicemember is guilty and, if so, 
adjudges the punishment.  Unless the servicemember is assigned to a 
vessel,30 the servicemember may demand a court-martial in lieu of the 
nonjudicial punishment.31 Finally, the commander may decide to initiate 
court-martial proceedings by formally preferring charges against the 
servicemember.32 
 
If charges are preferred, commanders move them up the chain of 
command for recommendations and actions. If the commander believes 
that the charges are serious enough to warrant a general court-martial 
(roughly equivalent to a civilian felony trial), the commander orders an 
Article 32 investigation.33 At that investigation the accused is entitled to 
be present, to have the assistance of counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, 
and to have witnesses produced.  Although the Article 32 investigation is 
                                                                                                             
right to counsel warnings); id. MIL. R. EVID. 311–16 (enumerating the rules addressing 
requirements for searches and seizures); and id. MIL. R. EVID. 321 (discussing the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications). 
28 SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 1-8, at 6 (listing various options available to military 
commander). 
29 Id. § 1-8(B), at 6. 
30 The term “vessel” is defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). “The word ‘vessel’ includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as 
a means of transportation on water.” 
31 See UCMJ art. 15 (2012) (setting out procedures for nonjudicial punishment). 
32 Id. art. 30.  Technically, any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges against 
another; however, in current practice, the preferral is almost always done by the 
servicemember’s immediate commander, and only a commander may actually send 
charges to a court-martial.  In the past, charges were apparently more often brought by an 
accuser who was not the commander.  See Bradley J. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in the 
Legion Army: American Military Law in the Early Republic, 1792-1796, 144 MIL. L. 
REV. 77, 103–04 (1994) (recounting a case in which each of two officers accused the 
other of slights to his own honor, resulting in three courts-martial, to the consternation of 
their commanding general); LOUISE BARNETT, UNGENTLEMANLY ACTS 53 (2000) (stating 
that in the post-Civil War U.S. Army, filings of charges and countercharges were 
common and absorbed a great deal of the time and energy of commanding officers). 
33 UCMJ art. 32. 
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often equated with a civilian grand jury, in many ways it is far more 
protective of an accused’s rights than a grand jury.34 
 
If the decision is made to refer the charges to a court-martial, the 
convening authority—a commander authorized by the UCMJ to 
“convene” a court-martial—selects the court members, but does not 
select either the counsel or the military judge. Specific provisions in the 
UCMJ prohibit a convening authority from unlawfully influencing the 
participants in the court-martial or the outcome of the case.35 In many 
cases, the accused and the convening authority engage in plea bargaining 
and execute a pretrial agreement.36 Typically, those agreements require 
the accused to plead guilty in return for a guaranteed maximum 
sentence.37  
 
                                                 
34 SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 7 (discussing and analyzing features of Article 32 
pretrial investigation). 
35 See UCMJ art. 37 (2012) (prohibiting unlawful command influence). Unlawful 
command influence is a perpetual threat to the military justice system and is the subject 
of considerable case law and commentary. See generally Major Martha Huntley Bower, 
Unlawful Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 28 A.F. L. REV. 65 
(1988) (discussing unlawful command influence); Anthony P. DeGiulio, Command 
Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 72 (1972) 
(examining “the disciplinary policies established by command directives, the prohibition 
against the accuser as convening authority, and the command control over court 
personnel, counsel, military judges, and case review”); Major Larry A. Gaydos & Major 
Michael Warren, What Commanders Need to Know About Unlawful Command Control, 
ARMY LAW., Oct. 1986, at 9 (presenting a methodology to “teach commanders about 
lawful and unlawful command and control”); Lieutenant James D. Harty, Unlawful 
Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 231 (1986) 
(discussing the corrective measures that must be taken when commanders “step over the 
line and undermine [the] right to a fair trial”); Joseph Hely, Command Influence on 
Military Justice, 15 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 300 (1970) (noting inherent tendency for command 
influence); Lieutenant Richard C. Johnson, Unlawful Command Influence: A Question of 
Balance, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. (NAVY) J. 87, 88 (Mar.–Apr. 1965) (considering 
command control “and the problem arising therefrom”); Craig Schwender, Who’s Afraid 
of Command Influence; or Can the Court of Military Appeals Be This Wrong?, ARMY 
LAW., Apr. 1992, at 19 (reviewing appellate cases involving instructional issues); Captain 
Samuel J. Rob, From Treakle to Thomas: The Evolution of the Law of Unlawful 
Command Influence, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1987, at 36 (assessing the impact of case law on 
the evolution of laws regarding unlawful command influence); James Thwing, An 
Appearance of Evil, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1983, at 13 (reviewing the problem with 
establishing limits over command influence); Luther C. West, A History of Command 
Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1970) (discussing 
command influence). 
36 SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 9.  
37 Id.  
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B. Trial Procedures 
 
At trial, the accused is entitled to virtually the same procedural 
protections he would have in a state or federal criminal court—largely 
because Article 36(a) requires that the rules of procedure for military 
courts parallel the procedures used in federal courts.  For example, a 
military accused has: 
 
 The right to a speedy trial (under the Sixth Amendment and 
under a 120-day speedy trial provision in the Manual for Courts-
Martial);38 
 The right to extensive discovery, including a right to access 
witnesses and documents that is supposed to be equal to the  
prosecution’s;39 
 The right to production of evidence for examination and 
testing;40 
 The right to request witnesses, including expert witnesses at 
Government expense;41 
 The right to request the assistance of experts at Government 
expense in preparing for trial;42 
 The right to confront witnesses;43  
 The right to select either trial with members or trial by judge 
alone;44 
 The right to request inclusion of enlisted members if the accused 
selects trial by members (effectively a jury trial);45 
 The right to full voir dire of the court members and the right to 
exercise both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges;46 
 The right to challenge the military judge for cause;47 and 
                                                 
38 UCMJ art. 10 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 707 (speedy trial rule).  The 120-
day rule does not include delays requested by the defense; thus, a case may take much 
longer than 120 days if the defense requests delays. 
39 UCMJ art. 46 (2012); see MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701 (setting out rules for 
discovery by both prosecution and defense counsel). 
40 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(B).  
41 Id. R.C.M. 703(d)(B)(i) (right to request employment of expert witness at government 
expense). 
42 Id. R.C.M. 702. 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
44 UCMJ art. 16 (2012). 
45 Id. art. 25.  
46 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 912. 
47 Id. R.C.M. 902. For grounds for possible challenges to the military judge, see UCMJ 
art. 26 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 502, 503 and 902. 
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 The right to file motions in limine, motions to suppress, and 
motions to dismiss the charges on a wide range of grounds (for 
example invoking constitutional privacy rights to dismiss rules 
or regulations governing personal conduct).48 
 
If an accused enters a guilty plea to any charges, the military judge is 
required to conduct a detailed “providency” inquiry to insure that the 
accused is pleading guilty voluntarily and knowingly,49 and that any 
pretrial agreement accurately reflects the intent of both the government 
and the accused50 and is consistent with public policy.51 
 
If the accused pleads not guilty, and the case is tried on the merits, 
the MRE apply during the trial.52 Those rules generally mirror the 
Federal Rules of Evidence but include a number of rules not found there. 
For example, Section III of the Military Rules includes very specific 
guidance on searches and seizures (including evidence seized during 
military inspections), confessions, eyewitness identification, and 
interception of oral and wire communications.  Section V contains 
fourteen detailed rules governing privileges.  In particular, Military Rule 
of Evidence 505 provides very detailed guidance on disclosure of 
classified information and Rule 506 provides equally specific guidance 
of disclosure of government information that would be detrimental to the 
public interest. 
 
Sentencing is a separate phase of the court-martial, though it 
typically occurs immediately after a finding of guilty.53  The Military 
Rules of Evidence (unlike the federal rules) apply at the sentencing 
phase.54 During sentencing, the accused is entitled to present witnesses 
and other evidence for the court’s consideration, and to challenge the 
prosecution’s evidence.55   
 
                                                 
48 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 905. See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 13. 
49 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 910; see United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 
1969) (setting out requirements for what has become known as the Care inquiry). 
50 United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453 
(C.M.A. 1976). 
51 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 910 (listing provisions which may make a pretrial 
agreement impermissible). 
52 See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, LEE D. SCHINASI & DAVID A. SCHLUETER, 
MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (7th ed. 2011). 
53 SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 16 (discussing sentencing procedures at courts-martial). 
54 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001; id. MIL. R. EVID. 1101. 
55 Id. R.C.M. 1001(c). 
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C. Post-Trial Procedures and Appellate Review 
 
Post-trial procedures are extremely detailed.  A copy of the record of 
trial is given to the accused, at no cost.56 Depending on the level of 
punishment imposed, a formal legal review of the proceedings is 
prepared.57 The post-trial review and recommendations are presented to 
the convening authority for consideration.58 During that process the 
accused has the right to present formally clemency matters.59 The 
convening authority has the discretion to approve or disapprove any 
findings of guilt and approve, suspend, or reduce the severity of the 
sentence.60 
 
For certain courts-martial, appellate review is automatic in the one of 
the service Courts of Criminal Appeals.61 Appellate counsel is provided 
free of charge.62 Members of those courts are high-ranking military 
officers.63 Those courts are given fact-finding powers64 and have the 
authority to reassess a court-martial sentence.65 
 
An accused may petition for further review by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), which sits in Washington, D.C.66 
That court is composed of five civilian judges, who are appointed by the 
President for fifteen-year terms.67  The entire process from the initial trial 
to review by the CAAF can take several years.68  During appellate 
review, it is not unusual for one of the appellate courts to reverse a court-
martial conviction for violation of one of the many procedural rules 
summarized above. 
 
                                                 
56 UCMJ art. 54(c) (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1104. 
57 UCMJ art. 60(d) (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1106. 
58 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1106. 
59 Id. R.C.M. 1105. 
60 UCMJ art. 60 (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1107. 
61 UCMJ art. 66 (2012). 
62 Id. art. 70. 
63 Id. art. 66. 
64 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1203(b) discussion. 
65 Id. 
66 UCMJ art. 67 (2012). 
67 Id. 
68 See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 17-11, at 1150–60 (discussing post-trial 
and appellate delays). 
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In certain cases, a servicemember may seek certiorari review by the 
Supreme Court of a decision by the CAAF.69 
 
 
D. Summary 
 
For purposes of this article, it is important to note several key points 
from the foregoing discussion: 
 
 First, the commander is deeply involved in, and is an integral 
part of, the military justice system.  
 Second, lawyers and judges are heavily involved at all levels in 
the system. 
 Third, a military accused is entitled to most, if not all, of the 
constitutional and statutory protections that are available to 
someone being tried in a civilian court. 
 Fourth, the system provides a comprehensive right to appeal a 
conviction. 
 
 
III. Analyzing the Military Justice Conundrum 
 
For the last sixty years, many commentators have vilified the 
military justice system,70 defended it,71 and recommended reforms.72 For 
                                                 
69 UCMJ art. 67(h) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012). See generally Effron, supra note 22, 
at 59 (overviewing the developments that led to the Military Justice Act). 
70 Michael I. Spak, Military Justice: The Oxymoron of the 1980s, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 436 
(1984); Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps, 28 
SW. U. LAW REV. 481 (1999). 
71 See Joseph W. Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215 (1973) 
(rejecting calls for abandonment of the military justice system); Major General William 
A. Moorman, Fifty Years of Military Justice: Does the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Need to be Changed?, 48 A.F.L. REV. 185 (2000) (reaffirming military justice); Louis B. 
Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 482 (1971) (discussing 
need for separate system); Poydasheff & Suter, supra note 5 (attempting to dispel 
misconceptions of military justice). 
72 See Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (And Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox 
Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 
L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 57 (describing the origin and development of military justice and 
the recommendations of the Cox Commission in 2001, and arguing that the current 
system contains marks of an older system, which was primarily disciplinary in nature); 
Colin A. Kisor, The Need for Sentencing Reform in Military Courts-Martial, 58 NAVAL 
L. REV. 39 (2009) (proposing statutory reforms for military sentencing to remedy the 
problem of unreasonably light sentences for very serious crimes); Henry B. Rothblatt, 
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example, they have raised questions about the commander’s role in 
selecting members to hear the case or about the role of the appellate 
courts in reviewing courts-martial convictions.  Virtually every one of 
these commentators, whether addressing one part of the system or the 
system as a whole, has discussed the relationship of the concepts of 
justice and discipline.   
 
Often the debate about the functions and purposes of a criminal 
justice system is cast in terms such as “liberal,” conservative,” 
“prosecution oriented,” “defense oriented, ”or “law and order.”73 Those 
terms, while effective as sound bites, are not particularly helpful in 
understanding the fundamentals of the debate. Something is missing. At 
one level they may accurately capture a person's viewpoint about 
criminal justice generally, or military justice specifically. But they do not 
define the criteria or values for measuring the purposes and effectiveness 
for a criminal justice system. 
 
In examining the military criminal justice system, the terms “justice” 
and “discipline” are often used to describe the two competing ideals or 
values which inform the system.  Although those terms, in themselves, 
are ambiguous and fluid, they are very familiar to those working within 
the system (commanders, lawyers, judges) and those responsible for its 
structure (Congress). These terms frame the military justice conundrum. 
 
Surprisingly, the UCMJ itself is silent on the issue of identifying the 
purposes of the military justice system.74 Thus, one is left to review 
secondary sources, such as the MCM and case law.  
 
The following sections discuss three possible approaches to 
analyzing the conundrum. Part IV discusses the various thematic 
approaches that courts and commentators have used to address the 
relationship between justice and discipline. Part V focuses on the 
                                                                                                             
Military Justice: The Need for Change, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (1971) (recognizing 
and rejecting the often emotionally charged criticisms of the system, but offering 
constructive comments on proposals that would improve the military justice system); 
Schlueter, supra note 11 (exploring the criticisms often leveled at the military justice 
system and targeting a number of areas where the system seems most vulnerable, such as 
size and composition of the courts-martial, and offering suggested changes). 
73 See, e.g., Madhavi McCall & Michael McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His 
Law and Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REV. 323 (2006) 
(discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s impact on criminal justice). 
74 See Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 40 (noting the UCMJ’s failure to address 
what the military justice system should accomplish). 
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application of the crime control and due process models discussed in 
Professor Packer’s law review article on that subject.  Finally, Part VI 
suggests using a purpose and functions approach to resolving the 
conundrum. 
 
 
IV. Thematic Approaches to the Conundrum 
 
In addressing the military justice system, courts and commentators 
often fall into one of several themes in deciding the purposes and 
functions of the system. In many instances the themes overlap. Two or 
more may be reflected in the same quote, testimony, or court opinion. In 
other instances, the themes reflect diametrically opposed viewpoints. 
  
The following discussion addresses those themes.  Those who use 
them may recognize the conundrum, but do not always attempt to resolve 
the conflict between discipline and justice.  
 
 
A. The “Deference” or “Hands-Off” Theme 
 
The Supreme Court of United States has generally expressed an 
attitude of deference in addressing issues arising under the military 
justice system. Rarely does Court actually address the purpose or 
function of military justice. Instead, a continuing theme is recognition of 
the critical role that Congress plays in dealing with the competing values 
of military justice and military discipline.75 From time to time the Court 
                                                 
75 There has been considerable commentary on the subject of review of courts-martial 
convictions by federal courts, and the deference they usually pay to the military. See 
generally Barney F. Bilello, Judicial Review and Soldiers’ Rights: Is the Principle of 
Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465 (Winter 1989) (providing 
review of the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing constitutional challenges to various 
military regulations and procedures); Donald S. Burris & David Anthony Jones, Civilian 
Courts and Courts-Martial—The Civilian Attorney’s Perspective, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
139 (1971) (exploring remedies that servicemembers have used in attempting to secure 
relief in civilian courts from adverse court-martial determinations); John K. Chapman, 
Reforming Federal Habeas Review of Military Convictions: Why AEDPA Would Improve 
the Scope and Standard of Review, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (2004) (suggesting that courts 
should apply standard and scope of review of the state habeas as under the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) to 
the military); Joshua E. Kastenberg, Cause and Effect: The Origins and Impact of Justice 
William O. Douglas’s Anti-Military Ideology from World War II to O’Callahan v. Parker, 
26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 163 (2009) (analyzing sources and effects of Justice Douglas’s 
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says something about the nature of military justice, but for the most part 
it defers to Congress and the President in this area. In Chappell v. 
Wallace,76 the Supreme Court commented:   
 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence. The 
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to 
the . . . control of a military force are essentially 
professional military judgments. 
 
The deference theme does not really address the conundrum. It 
simply reflects the view that the military justice system is different, and 
                                                                                                             
aversion to the legal construct of the military, particularly trial by court-martial); Major 
Stanley Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L. 
REV. 3 (1980) (discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition of controlling principle of 
“military necessity” in assessing the lawfulness of military regulations, orders, and laws); 
Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918–2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907 
(2006) (cataloging the Supreme Court’s tradition of deference to the military dating back 
to cases in World War I to the more recent Guantánamo Bay case decisions); John F. 
O’Connor, Statistics and the Military Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor 
Lichtman, 66 MD. L. REV. 668 (2007) (responding to article written by Professor Steven 
B. Lichtman regarding the Military Deference Doctrine); John F. O’Connor, The Origins 
and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000) 
(exploring historical application of the military deference doctrine); Richard Rosen, 
Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial, 
108 MIL. L. REV. 5 (1985) (examining the relationship between civilian and military 
courts and proposing a standard of collateral review that would define and equalize the 
roles of the federal judiciary and the military courts); Edward Sherman, Judicial Review 
of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REV. 
483 (1969) (discussing historical basis for limited review and addressing those cases, 
particularly Supreme Court decisions where a servicemember’s court-martial conviction 
has been reviewed); Scott Silliman, The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Court of 
Military Appeals, 18 A.F. L. REV. 81 (1976) (commenting on the “philosophy” of the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Military Appeals); Thomas Strassburg, Civilian Judicial 
Review of Military Criminal Justice, 66 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1974) (discussing the role of 
civilian courts in reviewing military courts-martial); Captain Dwight H. Sullivan, The 
Last Line of Defense: Federal Habeas Review of Military Death Penalty Cases, 144 MIL. 
L. REV. 1 (1994) (suggesting legislation to provide meaningful review of whether 
constitutional error occurred at the court-martial); Donald T. Weckstein, Federal Court 
Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and 
Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1971) (examining traditional deference paid 
by the federal courts to unique military needs in the sensitive areas of due process and 
constitutional rights and proposing guidelines to determine when federal review of 
military proceedings is necessary). 
76 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 
10 (1973)). 
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that civilian judges should not attempt to resolve the issue of whether the 
system is designed to promote discipline or justice. 
 
 
B. The “Separatist” Theme 
 
The military justice system is often described as a system separate 
and apart from civilian justice systems. For example, in Parker v. Levy,77 
the Court stated: 
 
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by 
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian 
society. We have also recognized that the military has, 
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its 
own during its long history. The differences between the 
military and civilian communities result from the fact 
that “it is the primary business of armies and navies to 
fight or ready to fight wars should the occasion 
arise . . . ” In In re Grimley, the Court observed: “An 
army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. 
Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open 
as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of 
obedience in the soldier.” More recently we noted that 
“[t]he military constitutes a specialized community 
governed by a separate discipline from that of the 
civilian,” and that “the rights of men in the armed 
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain 
overriding demands of discipline and duty  . . . .”78 
 
In United States v. Brown,79 the accused was charged with 
organizing a strike and encouraging others to do so during Desert Storm. 
In affirming his conviction, the court stated:  
 
This court has been sensitive to First and Sixth 
Amendments rights of servicemembers. But we are 
mindful that [j]udges are not given the task of running 
the Army . . . . The military constitutes a specialized 
                                                 
77 417 U.S. 733 (1974). In Parker, the Court held that Articles 133 and 134, UCMJ, were 
not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Id.  
78 Id. at 749 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
79 45 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
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community governed by a separate discipline from that 
of the civilian.  Orderly government requires that the 
judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate 
Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to 
intervene in judicial matters.80  
 
In United States v. Hawthorne,81 the court addressed the issue of 
whether a command-issued directive amounted to unlawful command 
influence on the accused’s court-martial.82 The Court of Military Appeals 
concluded that such influence had taken place and set aside the 
conviction. In his concurring opinion, Judge Latimer commented that 
“[i]n various areas involving disciplinary problems—of which judicial 
procedure is a necessary part—the convening authority has certain 
powers of his own, and unless he exceeds his authority he has a right to 
control his subordinates without interference by this Court . . . .” 
 
And in United States v. Borys,83 a case about the subject matter 
jurisdiction of courts-martial, the court recognized the need for military 
justice and that less favorable treatment of the defendant is necessary to 
an effective fighting force. The court stated that “the justification for 
such a system rests on the special needs of the military and history 
teaches that expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain 
carries with it a threat to liberty.”84   
 
 
C. The “Primarily Discipline” Theme 
 
From the beginnings of the United States’ military justice system, 
courts85 and most commentators86 agreed that the system was designed to 
                                                 
80 Id. at 393 (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)). 
81 22 C.M.R. 83 (C.M.A. 1956). 
82 The Commanding General of the Fourth Army had issued a directive stating that repeat 
Regular Army offenders should be removed from the military. Id. at 87.  
83 40 C.M.R. 259 (C.M.A. 1969). 
84 Id. at 260 (citing O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969)).  Under O’Callahan, 
and therefore under Borys, courts-martial did not have jurisdiction over “civil crimes 
committed in the United States against the civilian community when the local courts are 
open and functioning,” unless the crimes were “military-connected.”  This “military 
connection” test has since been overturned.  Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447–
49 (1987). 
85 See, e.g., O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969). Justice Douglas noted that 
“a court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a 
significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military 
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protect and promote military discipline. The “discipline” theme is 
generally reflected in court decisions addressing “purely military” crimes 
established by the UCMJ, such as absence without leave. But courts and 
commentators have also reflected this theme in discussing such issues as 
UCMJ jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers87 and the authority of a 
commander to impose nonjudicial punishment.88  
 
In 1776, Congress directed John Adams to revise the 1775 Articles 
of War. In addressing the new articles and the need for discipline, Adams 
wrote to his wife, Abigail: 
 
If I were an officer, I am convinced that I should be the 
most decisive disciplinarian in the army . . . . Discipline 
in an army is like the laws in a civil society. There can 
be no liberty in a commonwealth where the laws are not 
revered and most sacredly observed, nor can happiness 
                                                                                                             
discipline is preserved.” Id. He cited an article by Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 
COLUM. F. 46, 49 (1969), who had asserted that “none of the travesties of justice 
perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for military law has always been 
and continues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not justice.” United States 
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328, 333 (C.M.A. 
1988) (pointing out that a major objective of the military justice system is to obtain 
obedience by subordinates to orders of their superiors).  
86 See, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215 (1973) 
(rejecting calls for abandonment of the military justice system and noting the need for 
discipline); Stephen J. Carrol, A Proposal for Streamlining the Military Justice System, 
36 NAVAL L. REV. 187, 188 (1986) (noting that prompt but fair discipline is a goal of any 
criminal justice system); Ferris, supra note 8, at 445 (noting that “disciplinary function of 
the court-martial cannot be overstated”). Cf. R. Rivkin, GI RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: 
THE SERVICEMAN’S GUIDE TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAW 336–38 (1970) (indicating that 
studies showed that in a combat setting the fear of punishment is not a significant 
motivation). 
87 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (“We find 
nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them 
to rank along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people 
charged with offenses . . . . [T]rial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental 
to an army’s primary fighting function.”).  
88 For example, in United States v. Gammons, 51 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F.1999), the court 
addressed the question of whether trying a servicemember for a minor offense for which 
the servicemember had already received nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, 
violated the double jeopardy clause. The court held that that clause did not apply because 
Article 15 proceedings are not criminal proceedings—they are disciplinary in nature. Id. 
at 173–74. See also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31–31 (1976) (pointing out that 
nonjudicial punishment is an administrative method of dealing with minor offenses). 
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or safety in an army for a single hour when discipline is 
not observed.89 
 
General Sherman’s oft-quoted statement in a 1879 letter addressed 
the issue of the role of the military legal system: 
 
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human 
being in a community all the liberty, security, and 
happiness possible, consistent with the safety of all. The 
object of military law is to govern armies composed of 
strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest 
measure of force at the will of the nation. 
 
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each 
requires its own separate system of laws, statute and 
common. An army is a collection of armed men obliged 
to obey one man. Every enactment, every change of 
rules which impairs the principle weakens the army, 
impairs its values, and defeats the very object of its 
existence. All the traditions of civil lawyers are 
antagonistic to this vital principle, and military men 
must meet them on the threshold of discussion, else 
armies will become demoralized by even grafting on our 
code their deductions from civil practice.90 
 
Following World War I, there was a great debate among members of 
the armed forces and commentators about the role of military justice and 
the unjust treatment that servicemembers received under the system.91 In 
response to calls for changes in the military justice system, Professor 
John Henry Wigmore wrote: 
                                                 
89 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 289 (1962), quoted in JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY 
JUSTICE 6 (1992). 
90 Letter to General W. S. Hancock, President of Military Serv. Inst., from W.T. Sherman 
(Dec. 9, 1879), reprinted in GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MILITARY LAW 130 (1880) 
(reprinted from The Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States); 
Frederick Bernays Weiner quoted this language in his testimony before the House of 
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, March 16, 1949. Hearings on H.R. 2498 
Before a Spec. Subcomn. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 
780 (1949).    
91 Schlueter, supra note 2, at 157–58; see also JOHN M. LINDLEY, “A SOLDIER IS ALSO A 
CITIZEN”: THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE, 1917–1920 (1990); MAJOR 
GENERAL ENOCH H. CROWDER, MILITARY JUSTICE DURING THE WAR (1919), available at 
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/MJ_during_war.html. 
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The military system can say this for itself: It knows what 
it wants; and it systematically goes in and gets it. 
Civilian criminal justice does not even know what it 
wants; much less does it resolutely go it and get 
anything. Military justice wants discipline—that is, 
action in obedience to regulations and orders; this being 
absolutely necessary for prompt, competent, and 
decisive handling of masses of men. The court-martial 
system supplies the sanction of this discipline. It takes 
on the features of Justice because it must naturally 
perform the process of inquiring in a particular case, 
what was the regulation or order, and whether it was in 
fact obeyed. But its object is discipline.92 
 
In its decision in O’Callahan v. Parker,93 the Supreme Court 
established the service connection requirement for court-martial 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemembers.94 The Court 
addressed the criticisms of military justice and wrote that “[n]one of the 
travesties of justice perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, 
for military law has always been and continues to be primarily an 
instrument of discipline, not justice.”95 
 
More recently, the three authors of a text on military justice noted in 
their teachers’ manual for that text that: 
 
Chapter 1 attempts to convey the raison d’être for 
military law: the need to control the violence of war and 
impose discipline in the ranks. Its central theme is the 
tension between armed conflict and the rule of law, a 
                                                 
92 John H. Wigmore, Lessons from Military Justice, 4 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 151 (1921) 
(emphasis added), reprinted in Joseph W. Bishop, The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. 
L. REV. 215, 218 (1973). Regarding this quote, Professor Bishop observed that the clarity 
of purpose in the military justice system “compared favorably to the uncertainty of the 
civilian penal system as to whether it wants retribution, or prevention, or deterrence.” Id.  
93 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
94 After a historical review, the court came to this conclusion so that the Fifth 
Amendment exception to the right of grand jury indictment (“except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces . . . when in actual service . . .”) would not “be expanded to 
deprive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand 
jury and a trial by a jury of his peers.”  Id. at 272–73. 
95 Id. at 266 (emphasis added) (quoting Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. F. 
46, 49 (1969)). 
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tension that the substantive law and procedural rules of 
military law attempt to resolve.96  
 
In context, some of the foregoing statements reflecting the discipline 
theme were made at times when there was a perceived threat that the 
military justice system would be revised to more closely resemble, or be 
replaced by, a civilian justice system.97  
 
 
D. The “Justice-Based” Theme 
 
In stark contrast to the “discipline” theme is the “justice-based” 
theme. Some form of the “justice” theme has appeared in one form or 
another for decades—at least since the early Twentieth Century when, 
following World War I, there were concerted efforts (not always 
successful) to include more procedural protections for servicemembers.98 
In the 1980s the Department of Defense took bold steps to engraft the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
into military justice to the greatest extent possible.99 Those efforts 
                                                 
96 EUGENE R. FIDELL, ELIZABETH L. HILLMAN & DWIGHT H. SULLIVAN, MILITARY JUSTICE 
CASES AND MATERIALS, TEACHERS’ MANUAL 1 (2d ed. 2012) (emphasis added). See 
Colonel (Retired) Henry G. Green, Military Justice and Discipline: The Role of 
Punishment in the Military, THE REPORTER, June 1997, at 9 (observing that “discipline” is 
the sine qua non of an effective fighting force, the author presents a wide range of 
thoughts and perspectives on the role of military justice and punishment); Dennis Hunt, 
Trimming Military Jurisdiction: An Unrealistic Solution to Reforming Military Justice, 
63 CRIM. L.C AND P.S. 23 (1972) (arguing that discipline is the only way to preserve law 
and order and expanded jurisdiction of courts-martial is the only way to preserve 
discipline). 
97 See generally Lindsy Nicole Alleman, Who Is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The 
Disciplinary Role of the Commander in Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
169 (2006) (providing an overview of the role of the commander in the military justice 
system); Spak, supra note 70 (noting that military discipline does not require a broad 
military justice system that encroaches upon the constitutional rights of military 
personnel); Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12 (observing that the UCMJ is “too 
slow, too cumbersome, too uncertain, indecisive, and lacking in power to reinforce 
accomplishment of the military mission, to deter misconduct, or even to rehabilitate”). 
98 In what is often referred to as the “Ansell-Crowder” dispute, General Crowder took a 
position that emphasized the need for a strong system that focused on the discipline 
component of military justice. Major Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The 
Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967); LINDLEY, supra note 
92, passim; CROWDER, supra note 91, passim. 
99 See George R. Smawley, In Pursuit of Justice, A Life of Law and Public Service: 
United States District Court Judge and Brigadier General (Retired) Wayne E. Alley (U.S. 
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resulted in the adoption of the Military Rules of Evidence in 1980100 and 
four years later, the 1984 MCM. 
 
In the 1984 MCM the drafters added a Preamble, which addressed in 
part the nature and purpose of military law. 
 
3. Nature and purpose of military law. 
 
* * * 
The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to 
assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the 
armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in 
the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the 
national security of the United States.101 
 
The fact that this language first addressed the purpose of promoting 
justice and then second, the purpose of “maintaining good order and 
discipline” signaled a shift, apparently resolving the military justice 
conundrum in favor of the “justice” component. 
 
Commentators citing the preamble have stated that the military 
justice system is now “justice based.” For example, in their treatise on 
court-martial practice, Colonel Gilligan and Professor Lederer have 
stated that: 
 
Insofar as our fundamental goal is concerned, it is clear 
that military criminal law in the United States is justice-
based. This is not, however, incompatible with 
discipline. Congress has, at least implicitly, determined 
that discipline within the American fighting force 
requires that personnel believe that justice will be done. 
In short, the United States uses a justice-oriented system 
to ensure discipline; in our case, justice is essential to 
discipline.102 
 
                                                                                                             
Army 1952–1954, 1959–1981), 208 MIL. L. REV. 213 (2011) (recounting General Alley’s 
role in the drafting of the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE)). 
100 See Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules Of Evidence: Origins and Judicial 
Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REV. 5 (1990) (discussing origins of MRE). 
101 MCM, supra note 17, pmbl. (emphasis added).  
102 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC LEDERER, COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 1-20.00, 
at 2 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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More recently, the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, 
Lieutenant General Harding, addressed the question of instilling good 
order and discipline and its important role in creating an effective combat 
power. He wrote: 
 
Due process enhances discipline. America’s mothers 
and fathers send their sons and daughters to us to join 
our all-volunteer force because they believe their 
children will be fairly treated. They believe and expect 
that we will adhere to due process in judging their 
children, should they violate our code; otherwise, they 
would not have sent them to us. As a result, when we 
adhere to due process, we send a message to those 
parents, parents of other prospective Airmen and all 
Airmen everywhere that they can trust the Air Force to 
treat its Airmen fairly and to protect and promote justice 
within our service. By protecting our recruiting and 
retention pipelines, due process safeguards our combat 
effectiveness. Conversely, when we permit due process 
to suffer, we discourage enlistment of America’s best 
and brightest; we demoralize and discourage the 
retention of currently-serving Airmen, who worry they 
will likewise be treated unfairly, and as a consequence, 
we degrade military discipline and combat effectiveness. 
103 
 
This view seems to take the justice-based theme to a new level. 
While it usually accepted that the lack of due process in the military 
justice system can adversely affect morale,104 it is quite another thing, 
and certainly more difficult to prove, that due process actually enhances 
discipline and is a motivation for individuals to join the armed forces.  
 
It would be incorrect to assume that the conundrum can be resolved 
by simply adopting either the discipline theme approach or the justice 
                                                 
103 Lieutenant General Richard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice, REPORTER, 
Summer 2010, at 4 (bold heading in original, emphasis added). 
104 See, e.g., Timothy W. Murphy, A Defense of the Role of the Convening Authority: The 
Integration of Justice and Discipline, 28 No. 3 THE REPORTER 3 (2001) (stating that if 
troops perceive that courts-martial are arbitrary and unjust, disciplinary effect will be 
destroyed); Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 66–67 (noting results of survey of 
officers attending the Army War College). 
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theme approach.105 Many of the following themes reflect an attempt to 
reconcile the two main components.  
 
 
E. The “Competing Interests” Theme 
 
A number of themes attempt to consider both justice and discipline 
together. The first of these is the “competing interests” theme. The 
accused in United States v. Perry106 was convicted of violating a lawful 
general regulation. The accused argued that the regulation had been 
promulgated by the base commander who had then convened the court-
martial to try the accused. The Air Force Board of Review concluded 
that the convening authority’s interest in the case was only official and 
stated that: 
 
Actually the question is more basic than appears for it 
concerns the official duties of a commander as well as 
the right of an accused to be tried by an impartial court. 
There is no question but that a commander is required by 
law, regulation or custom to issue such orders and 
publish such regulations or directives as may be 
necessary for the proper administration of his command. 
His official duties require that he not only maintain 
discipline but also compel compliance with such official 
orders, regulations and/or directives he has found 
necessary, in his sound discretion, to promulgate. On the 
other hand there is no question but that an accused is 
entitled to a fair trial by an impartial court.107 
 
The court concluded that the convening authority’s interest in the 
case was official rather than personal, and as such did not render the trial 
unfair.108  But in using this language, it implicitly recognized that the 
                                                 
105 See, e.g., Ferris, supra note 8, at 446 (stating that historically, the “primary purpose of 
the courts martial [sic] was to regulate the military conduct of servicemen,” signaling that 
under the current military justice system the primary function is provide justice) 
(emphasis added). Any implication in the justice theme that the military justice system is 
no longer concerned with governing the conduct or misconduct of servicemembers is not 
true. As noted in the discussion at Part V.E.1.d., above, elements of the current military 
justice system clearly represent the need for a commander to be able to deal with 
servicemembers who engage in misconduct. 
106 12 C.M.R. 894 (A.F.B.R. 1953). 
107 Id. at 896 (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at 897.  
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needs of justice (having the case tried by an impartial tribunal) were in 
competition with the needs of discipline (having the commander both 
issue orders and send Airmen to trial for violating those orders).  
 
 
F. The “Inseparable” Theme 
 
Another thematic approach to the conundrum is to view the 
discipline and justice components as interrelated, integrated, or 
inseparable. 
 
In the Powell Report to the Secretary of the Army in 1960 on the 
status of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Committee 
(composed of distinguished high-ranking Army officers) noted: 
 
Discipline—a state of mind which leads to a willingness 
to obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous 
the task to be performed—is not a characteristic of a 
civilian community. Development of this state of mind 
among soldiers is a command responsibility and a 
necessity. In the development of discipline, correction of 
individuals is indispensable; in correction, fairness or 
justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake to talk of 
balancing discipline and justice—the two are 
inseparable . . .  
 
Once a case is before a court-martial it should be 
realized by all concerned that the sole concern is to 
accomplish justice under the law. This does not mean 
justice as determined by the commander referring a case 
or by anyone not duly constituted to fulfill a judicial 
role. It is not proper to say that a military court-martial 
has a dual function as an instrument of discipline and as 
an instrument of justice. It is an instrument of justice and 
in fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.109 
 
                                                 
109 AD HOC COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT TO 
HON. WILLIAM R. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 11–12 (18 Jan. 1960) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Powell_report.pdf. 
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In United States v. Littrice,110 the Court of Military Appeals 
addressed the question of unlawful command influence on the accused’s 
court-martial. The court addressed Congress’s concerns about that issue 
in adopting the UCMJ. Writing for the court, Judge Latimer stated: 
 
It was generally recognized that military justice and 
military discipline were essentially interwoven. 
Nevertheless, a sharp conflict arose between those who 
believed the maintenance of military discipline with the 
armed forces required that commanding officers control 
the courts-martial proceedings and those who believed 
that unless control of the judicial machinery was taken 
away from the commanders military justice would 
always be a mockery.111 
 
 
G. The “Two Sides of the Same Coin” Theme 
 
Related to the “inseparable” theme, discussed supra, is the theme 
that views the justice and discipline components as different sides of the 
same coin. In his article on the role of the Court of Military Appeals in 
the 1970’s, Captain John Cooke wrote: 
 
The precept [of the relationship of justice and discipline] 
has generally been reflected in the tendency of the court 
to distinguish and separate functions exercised by the 
commander and other line personnel. The commander is 
permitted to retain his disciplinary functions, but his 
functions in administering justice (i.e. judicial functions) 
have been taken from him. This dichotomization has 
been effectuated in other ways as well, as the court has 
attempted to guard against what it perceives as undue 
infringement of the integrity of the administration of 
justice by disciplinary activities and attitudes. This 
tendency deserves close scrutiny, for it must be 
recognized that justice and discipline are properly but 
two sides of the same coin; to the extent that the court 
                                                 
110 13 C.M.R. 43 (C.M.A. 1953). 
111 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
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separates them unnecessarily, it risks devaluing the 
whole system.112 
 
However, Generals Westmoreland and Prugh, in a later article, 
presented a different view of this theme: 
 
It is misleading to regard justice and discipline as 
different sides of the same coin, if the statement is to 
imply that the two concepts are opposites or 
complementary; that discipline must be balanced by 
justice, and vice versa. Discipline is but one tool for a 
commander, albeit an important, even essential, one; its 
essential focus addresses mission accomplishment. 
Justice encompasses fairness to the individual who may 
be accused of military wrongdoing and prosecution of 
such an accused only in accordance with the law. The 
two ideas are quite disparate—if one is an apple, the 
other is an orange. 
 
It is submitted that the other side of the coin from justice 
should more accurately be called military exigency. This 
is very different from discipline, which envisions 
conduct responsive to established rules.113 
 
 
H. The “Middle Ground” Theme 
 
In 1946, the Secretary of War appointed a War Department Advisory 
Committee on Military Justice, whose members were nominated by the 
American Bar Association.  A “middle ground” theme appears in the 
report of this committee, sometimes referred to as the Vanderbilt Report 
after the chair of the committee, Arthur Vanderbilt. The Committee was 
formed to study the extant system of military justice and to make 
recommendations for changes. In its report, the Committee stated:  
 
A high military commander pressed by the awful 
responsibilities of his position and the need for speedy 
                                                 
112 Captain John S. Cooke, The United States Court of Military Appeals, 1975–1977: 
Judicializing the Military Justice System, 76 MIL. L. REV. 43, 52 (Spring 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
113 Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 48 (emphasis added). 
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action has no sympathy with legal obstructions and 
delays, and is prone to regard the courts-martial 
primarily as instruments for enforcing discipline by 
instilling fear and inflicting punishment, and he does not 
always perceive that the more closely he can adhere to 
civilian standards of justice, the more likely he will be to 
maintain the respect and the morale of troops recently 
drawn from the body of the people  
 
Some of the critics of the Army system err on the other 
side and demand the meticulous preservation of the 
safeguards of the civil courts in the administration of 
justice in the courts of the Army. We reject this view for 
we think there is a middle ground between the viewpoint 
of the lawyer and the viewpoint of the general.114 
                                                 
114 REPORT OF WAR DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 5 (13 Dec. 
1946) [hereinafter VANDERBILT REPORT] (emphasis added), available at http://www.loc. 
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/report-war-dept-advisory-committee.pdf.. The Report, 
commonly referred to as the Vanderbilt Report, was submitted by an Advisory 
Committee appointed by Edward F. Witsell, Sec’y of War, War Dep’t Memorandum No. 
25–46 (25 Mar. 1946). Arthur T. Vanderbilt chaired the committee (later he became 
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court) which consisted of members and judges 
of the civilian bar, from various states. The appointing memorandum stated: 
 
The function of the Committee will be to study the administration of 
military justice within the Army and the Army's courts-martial 
system, and to make recommendations to the Secretary of War as to 
changes in existing laws, regulations, and practices which the 
Committee considers necessary or appropriate to improve the 
administration of military justice in the Army. 
 
Id. at 2. The Advisory Committee heard testimony from numerous senior military 
officials at hearings conducted in Washington, D.C., heard additional testimony at 
regional public hearings and considered hundreds of letters, the results of a questionnaire 
sent to officers and enlisted men, and statistical and result studies prepared by the Judge 
Advocate General’s Department. Id. at 5.  
Attachments to the Committee’s report include answers by respondents to a number 
of questions posed by the Committee. The first question focused on “The purposes of the 
court-martial system: maintenance of discipline or administration of justice?” The 
Committee reported that “Fifty-two [general officers] indicated that the purpose was a 
combination of justice and discipline. Only four listed discipline as the primary purpose, 
and six emphasized justice.” Id. at 1 (Compilation of Answers), located at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Vanderbilt-B_Outline.pdf. For results from a 
similar survey taken at the Army War College in 1971–72. See Colonel Joseph N. Tenhet 
& Colonel Robert B. Clarke, Attitudes of US Army War College Students Toward the 
Administration of Military Justice, 59 MIL. L. REV. 27 (1973). 
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The Advisory Committee was one of several bodies considering 
changes to the military justice system. In 1948, Secretary of Defense 
James Forrestal appointed a special committee, chaired by Professor 
Edmund Morgan, to consider drafting a uniform code of justice that 
would apply to all of the services.115  
 
Professor Morgan’s subsequent testimony regarding the proposed 
uniform code presented yet another theme—“the fair and delicate 
balance” theme, infra. 
 
 
I. The “Fair and Delicate Balance” Theme 
 
In his statement to Congress in 1949, concerning the proposed 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Professor Edmund Morgan116 stated: 
 
We are convinced that a Code of Military Justice cannot 
ignore the military circumstances under which it must 
                                                                                                             
Similarly, the Committee received responses to the same question from judge 
advocates (combat, regular Army judge advocates, Board of Review judge advocates, and 
staff judge advocates). The Committee reported their answers to that question in chart 
form. See http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Vanderbilt-B_Outline.pdf. In 
contrast to the responses from the general officers, thirty-five judge advocates indicated 
that the purpose of the court-martial system was to maintain discipline and administer 
justice; ten judge advocates listed discipline as the primary purpose and six listed justice 
as the primary purpose. Interestingly, of the six listing justice, three were on the Army 
Board of Review.  
In its report the Committee also stated,  
 
We desire to make it clear at the outset that our findings are not based on the 
testimony of convicted men or their friends. Complaints from that source were 
considered by the committee headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts who examined 
court-martial sentences for severity after the war and many instances reduced 
them. 
 
VANDERBILT REPORT, supra, at 2. 
115 The appointment of this committee resulted from correspondence from Senator Chan 
Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to Secretary Forrestal. 
Senator Gurney had written that his Committee was considering a number of proposals 
for changing the military justice system but that there had been no proposal to consider 
and recommend a uniform system of military justice. The correspondence between 
Senator Gurney and Secretary Forrestal can be viewed at http://www.loc.gov/ 
rr/frd/Military_Law/Morgan-Papers/Vol-I_correspondence.pdf. 
116 In 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appointed Professor Morgan to serve as 
the chair of a special committee to draft a uniform code of justice that would apply to all 
of the armed services. 
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operate but we were equally determined that it must be 
designated to administer justice. 
 
We therefore, aimed at providing functions for the 
command and appropriate procedures for the 
administration of justice. We have done our best to strike 
a fair balance, and believe that we have given 
appropriate recognition of each factor.117 
 
Five years later the Court of Military Appeals recognized this theme 
in United States v. Littrice,118 a case addressing the issue of command 
influence. The court stated: 
 
Thus, confronted with the necessity of maintaining a 
delicate balance between justice and discipline, Congress 
liberalized the military judicial system but also permitted 
commanding officers to retain many of the powers held 
by them under prior laws. While it struck a compromise, 
Congress expressed an intent to free courts-martial 
members from any improper and undue influence by 
commanders which might affect an honest and 
conscientious consideration of the guilt or innocence of 
an accused. Both the Code and the Manual announce the 
same caveat. . . . 
On the command side of the ledger, we find some 
provisions which indicate that [the commander] is not to 
be too tightly fettered by the new Code. 
 
* * * 
 
The same delicate balance which beset Congress now confronts 
us.  Justice can be dispensed and discipline maintained if one is 
not permitted to overwhelm the other. Both should be given 
recognition and both must be governed and guided by the 
necessities peculiar to the military service.119 
 
                                                 
117 INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 606 (2000 
Reprint, Hein). 
118 13 C.M.R. 43 (C.M.A. 1953). 
119 Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Coates, 25 C.M.R. 559, 564 
(A.B.R. 1958) (quoting this language from Littrice). 
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J. The “Emasculation” Theme 
 
Regardless of how one views the military justice conundrum, it is 
clear that lawyers have been deeply involved in addressing military 
justice issues.120 In a letter to General W.S. Hancock, in 1879, General 
William T. Sherman addressed the role of lawyers in military justice. He 
stated: 
 
I agree that it will be a grave error if by negligence we 
permit the military law to become emasculated by 
allowing lawyers to inject into it the principles derived 
from their practice in the civil courts, which belong to a 
totally different system of jurisprudence.121  
 
General Sherman, a lawyer himself, continued by stating that the 
needs of the military are unique and that civil justice systems standards 
and procedures can threaten the military.122 This theme, while colorful, 
may be still be shared by some who view lawyers with skepticism—
especially by those who are concerned that the role of the commander 
has been replaced by armed forces lawyers and judges.  
 
 
K. The “Un-American” Theme 
 
As noted above, after World War I there was heated debate about the 
function and role of military justice in what has become known as the 
“Ansell-Crowder” dispute.123 The controversy centered in part, on the 
question of whether courts-martial were actually judicial bodies or 
                                                 
120 Brigadier General (Retired) John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, ARMY LAW, Mar. 2000, at 1, 1 (noting participation of judge advocates 
in development of military justice system). 
121 Letter to General W. S. Hancock, supra note 90; See also THE ARMY LAWYER: A 
HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, 1775–1975, at 12 (1975) 
[hereinafter JAGC HISTORY]. 
122 Id. Professor Turley notes that Sherman’s concern was that the military “should resist 
external influences, particularly legal values,” and emphasized the “cultural necessities of 
the military community in contrast to those of the larger republic.” Jonathan Turley, The 
Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 97 (2002). 
123 See Frederick B. Weiner, The Seamy Side of the World War I Court-Martial 
Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 109 (1989) (recounting what has been labeled the 
“Crowder-Ansell” dispute concerning court-martial practices during World War I). See 
also Major Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General 
Samuel T Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967). 
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instead agencies of the Executive Branch.  The latter position was taken 
by Colonel Winthrop in his treatise124 and by General Crowder. In sharp 
contrast, General Ansell125 took the position that courts-martial were 
judicial in nature and that it was important to create an appellate court to 
review courts-martial convictions to insure that abuses did not occur at 
the trial level. In a 1919 law review article General Ansell wrote that: 
 
I contend—and I have gratifying evidence of support not 
only from the public generally but from the profession—
that the existing system of Military Justice is un-
American, having come to us by inheritance and rather 
witless adoption out of a system of government which 
we regard as fundamentally intolerable; that it is archaic, 
belonging as it does to an age when armies were but 
bodies of armed retainers and bands of mercenaries; that 
it is a system arising out of and regulated by the mere 
power of Military Command rather than Law; and that it 
has ever resulted, as it must ever result, in such injustice 
as to crush the spirit of the individual subjected to it, 
shock the public conscience and alienate public esteem 
and affection from the Army that insists on maintaining 
it.126 
 
                                                 
124 WINTHROP, supra note 14, at 48. Colonel Winthrop stated that courts-martial did not 
belong to the judicial department and were thus simply “instrumentalities of the executive 
power.” 
125 At the time of the internal dispute between the two generals, Ansell was informally 
acting as the Judge Advocate General, in the absence of Crowder, the Judge Advocate 
General, who had been assigned the task of running the Selective Service System.  LURIE, 
supra note 89, at 48. 
126 Samuel Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919) (emphasis added). See also 
Samuel Ansell, Some Reforms in Our System of Military Justice, 32 YALE L.J. 146 (1922) 
(discussing proposed amendments to the Articles of War). In his Yale Law Journal 
article, General Ansell cited the preface to the proposed bill:  
 
The primary principle of this Bill is to establish Military Justice, and 
regulate it by Law rather than by mere Military Command; or, stating 
it differently, to supersede personal Military Power over Military 
Justice by Public Law, to be effective for this purpose, must be law in 
its primary sense—a rule established beyond the control of the 
Department and the Army which are to administer it. . . . 
 
Id. at 151 (citing Senate Committee Print of S. 64, 66th Congress, 1st Session 2 
et seq. (1919)). 
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General Ansell’s ideas about creating appellate courts to review 
courts-martial did not come to fruition until almost three decades later,127 
with the adoption of the UCMJ.128 
 
 
L. The “Justice and Discipline Are Not Opposites” Theme 
 
In his testimony before Congress in 1949 on the proposed UCMJ, 
Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener testified as follows: 
 
Colonel Weiner. It is sometimes asked what is the object 
of military law. It is generally put as a personal 
question. Do you consider that the object of military law 
is to maintain discipline or to maintain justice? My 
answer always is that those are not opposites. You 
cannot maintain discipline by administering justice. The 
standards of guilt and innocence in military law are not 
different from civil law. Possibly there is a little more 
relaxation on what is harmless error than in the civil 
courts. But the real difference is the object and the 
amount of punishment. The object of the civilian 
criminal court generally is to reform and rehabilitate the 
offenders. The object of the military law is not 
vindictiveness. It is to act as a deterrent so that when the 
first man steps out of line and gets a hard sentence it will 
deter others.  
Mr. Rivers. In that connection there is no use for us to 
confuse the basic objective of keeping morale with the 
ultimate disposition of justice. 
 
Colonel Wiener. Precisely. 
                                                 
127 In his book, Arming Military Justice: The Origins of the United States Court of 
Military Appeals, 1775–1950, Jonathan Lurie notes that in contrast to General Crowder, 
who was “reflective, somewhat hesitant in manner, and comfortable in a bureaucratic 
environment,” General Ansell was “much more aggressive in manner,” “impatient to get 
results,” and “believed very deeply in his causes.” That might explain, at least in part, his 
strident and overreaching comments about military justice. JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING 
MILITARY JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, 
1775–1950, at 50–51 (1992). 
128 Ironically, Professor Edmund Morgan (who was then teaching at Harvard) had served 
as an Army Judge Advocate under General Ansell and three decades later chaired the 
committee that drafted the new uniform code, which created the Court of Military 
Appeals—one of life’s ironies.  
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Mr. Rivers. And they need not be opposites.129 
 
Colonel Weiner continued by testifying that the purpose of military 
justice was to act as a deterrent to other servicemembers: 
 
Colonel Wiener. But the military justice has to be swift 
and its punishment will frequently be more severe. There 
is always an irreducible number in any group, 
particularly in a large number raised by selective service, 
who can only be ruled by fear and compulsion. If you 
have a system of military justice which minimizes a 
possibility that a guilty man can “beat the rap,” then you 
have an effective system of military justice. The more 
loopholes you inject the more the man feels, “Oh, well, I 
can get a lawyer; I can appeal it on up; I can get off.” To 
that extent you impair the object of military law. I am 
not suggesting that anybody be sent to the guardhouse 
on general principles or anything like that. You do have 
the irreducible minimum that can only be ruled by fear. 
You do have the necessity for swift and sure 
punishment, and you do have to have a feeling in the 
sense of the individual, “Well, maybe I had better not, 
because dire punishment will follow.130 
 
 
M. The “Justice and Discipline Are Not Synonymous” Theme 
 
In contrast to the “not opposites” theme, supra, is the opinion of the 
Coast Guard Board of Review in United States v. McCarty.131 In that 
case, the board addressed the aims of punishment in the military criminal 
justice system in a desertion case. The court noted that 
 
[s]ociety, whether military or civilian, still insists on 
punishment for crimes and offenses. In the military 
where approximately 75% of all offenses involve 
unauthorized absence (which is no crime at all in civil 
                                                 
129 INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 780 (2000 
Reprint, Hein) (emphasis added).  
130 Id. at 781. For a discussion about the role of deterrence in sentencing, see Part 
V.E.1.h, infra. 
131 29 C.M.R. 757 (C.G.B.R. 1960). 
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life) punishment is thought necessary in the interest of 
military discipline. Even so, the Navy long since 
recognized that “Discipline and punishment are not 
always synonymous . . . . The question of punishment 
can be considered only when the cause of the offense has 
been correctly determined. Severity of punishment alone 
has never provided an answer to penal and disciplinary 
problems.”132 
 
 
N. The “Oxymoron” Theme 
 
In his law review article objecting to any expansion of court-martial 
jurisdiction over servicemembers, Professor Spak wrote: 
 
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
military personnel are denied the right to grand jury 
indictment, trial by impartial jury, and bail. In addition, 
military personnel are denied the right to independent 
counsel. There is no doubt that military personnel enjoy 
less constitutional rights than their civilian counterparts. 
It is this author's aim to extend all of the constitutional 
rights traditionally enjoyed by United States citizens to 
military personnel absent compelling justification. 
Therefore, it is contended that court-martial jurisdiction 
should be limited to those statutory offenses that require 
military status and therefore should apply exclusively to 
members of the armed forces. In sum, it is the author's 
thesis that military justice is the oxymoron of the 
1980's.133 
                                                 
132 Id. at 762 (quoting NAVAL JUSTICE 48, 51 (1949)) (emphasis added). 
133 Spak, supra note 70, at 437–38 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  He also stated: 
 
An additional reason to restrict court-martial jurisdiction is found in 
the very nature of procedural military justice. Although not all 
aspects of military criminal procedure are narrower than their civilian 
counterpart, on balance, Military Criminal Procedure is so ineffective 
in protecting the constitutional rights of military personnel, that it 
passes the point of being obscene. 
 
Id. at 457 (emphasis added). To support this proposition, Professor Spak cited L. WEST, 
THEY CALL IT JUSTICE (1977) and R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS 
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O. The “Hybrid” Theme 
 
One commentator has recommended that the military justice system 
could be streamlined by, for example, eliminating the right of a 
servicemember to refuse nonjudicial punishment and by addressing 
delays in the Article 32 investigation. In addressing those issues, he 
noted: 
 
Throughout history, members of the military have been 
subjected to a separate criminal justice system oriented 
toward reinforcement of proper behavior and 
punishment of misbehavior. Initially, commanding 
officers had complete control over the courts-martial 
process. A formal criminal court system consisting of 
trial and appellate judges did not exist. Over the course 
of United States history, civilian notions of criminal 
justice and criminal trial practice have been fused into 
the court-martial system. Following World War II, many 
of these notions were statutorily imposed on the armed 
forces. Today the court-martial is a hybrid criminal trial 
with remnants of the earlier command-controlled 
model.134 
 
The hybrid theme, at least as it is presented in the quote, assumes 
that the role of the commander is no longer what it once was. That is not 
entirely true, as noted in Part V.E.1.d, below. 
 
 
P. The “Legitimation” Theme 
 
One writer—in focusing on the legitimacy of the military justice 
system—made the following observation: 
 
Legitimacy is an essential feature of an effective system 
of criminal justice. In order to maintain authority over 
those it regulates, a criminal justice system must remain 
legitimate in the eyes of those people. When people 
                                                                                                             
MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1971), which in the ’70s and ’80s were often cited by 
critics of the military justice system.  
134 Stephen J. Carrol, A Proposal for Streamlining the Military Justice System, 36 NAVAL 
L. REV. 187, 187–88 (1986) (emphasis added). 
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perceive the criminal process as fair and legitimate, they 
are more likely to accept its results as accurate and are 
more likely to obey the substantive laws that the system 
enforces. Moreover, such people are more likely to 
cooperate with police and prosecutors, who necessarily 
rely on the trust of the community to carry out their roles 
in the criminal justice system.135  
 
The author continues by noting that the legitimacy of a criminal 
justice system is enhanced when “observers and defendants believe that 
prosecutors are pursuing justice.”136 
 
This theme relates to the view often expressed in conjunction with 
the “justice-based” theme, supra, that regardless of the commander’s 
need to maintain good order and discipline, if the command perceives 
that a servicemember has not been treated fairly by the system, discipline 
may actually suffer in the long run. 
 
 
Q. The “Paternalistic” Theme 
 
Some have viewed the military justice system as being paternalistic. 
For example, in United States v. Sunzeri,137 the court concluded that a 
provision in the accused’s pretrial agreement that he could not present 
the testimony of certain witnesses during sentencing violated the 
MCM.138 In dissent, one of the judges wrote: 
 
The military justice system, as it is currently designed 
and has developed—with its post-World War II 
philosophy, revisions, and implementation of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice—is quite paternalistic 
in some regards, with its numerous built-in safeguards to 
protect the individual servicemember in his or her quest 
to navigate, in his or her best interests, the treacherous 
                                                 
135 Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (2010) (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
136 Id. at 942. See also Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental 
Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105 (2005) 
(discussing legitimacy of criminal justice systems from subjective viewpoint of 
observers). 
137 59 M.J. 758 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2004). 
138 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B). 
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waters of military discipline. While there is, of course, 
absolutely nothing wrong with this approach, I think 
sometimes we may let it color too much our reading and 
interpretation of those safeguards.139 
 
In contrast to that position, the court in United States v. Rivera,140 
five years earlier had observed that the military justice system had grown 
less paternalistic.141 
 
 
R. The “Civilianization” Theme 
 
Commentators who recommend reforms to the military justice 
system typically compare the system to civilian counterparts, whether in 
the United States or other countries. Apparently the belief is that the 
civilian system reflects qualities that should be applied to pretrial, trial, 
and appellate proceedings in the military. For example, Professor 
Sherman has observed: 
 
The American court-martial, with its command-
dominated structure, all military personnel, commander-
selected jury primarily from the officer class, inadequate 
pre-trial procedures, and limited appeals, provides 
servicemen with an inferior form of criminal justice. 
Proposed reforms of the UCMJ would remedy some of 
these problems but would leave intact the structure of 
court-martial, with its intrinsic relationship to military 
                                                 
139 Sunzeri, 59 M.J. at 762 (emphasis added).  
140 44 M.J. 527 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996). 
141 Id. at 530. See United States v. Shelwood, 15 M.J. 222, 224 n.1 (C.M.A. 1983) (noting 
that MRE 103(a)(1) is less paternalistic than pre-Rule standards); United States v. Means, 
20 M.J. 522, 528 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (stating that development of independent defense 
counsel system was a fundamental change in policy that “transformed an excessively 
paternalistic system for litigating criminal cases into a truly adversarial one”). See also 
Captain John A. Schaefer, Current Effective Assistance of Counsel Standards, ARMY 
LAW., June 1986, at 7, 16 (pointing out that the military justice system has transformed 
courts-martial from being excessively paternalistic to adversarial); Corey Wielert, 
Affecting the Bargaining Process in Pretrial Agreements: Waiving Appellate Rights in 
the Military Justice System, 79 UMKC L. REV. 237, 254 (2010) (arguing that military 
justice has transformed from paternalistic system to more adversarial, especially 
regarding waiver of Article 32 investigations); Major Eugene Milhizer, Curing Variance 
on Appeal, ARMY LAW., July 1991, at 32 (proffering that the trend is to rely on counsel 
rather than on paternalistic protection of trial and appellate judges). 
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disciplinary policies and control. Reforms along the lines 
of either the British or West German-Swedish models, 
resulting in the separation and civilianization of military 
justice functions, appear to be a feasible way to provide 
American servicemen with greater justice.142  
 
The suggested reforms, which many believe would truly 
“civilianize” the military justice system, generally focus on removing the 
commander from the equation.143 In contrast to that position, Judge Raby 
of the Army Court of Criminal Review wrote: 
 
[I] wish to muse whether we gatekeepers of military law 
are not inadvertently finding more and more novel ways 
in which gradually to ease line officers and commanders 
out of the military system—moving it ever closer to the 
civilian justice model. Quarere: If this trend continues, 
could we reach a point, in futuro, where the military 
justice system is no longer unique, and thus is no longer 
necessary?144 
 
 
S. The “Judicialization” Theme 
 
The judicialization theme is used to describe the process of treating 
the commander as a judicial officer for some functions in the military 
                                                 
142 Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L. J. 1398, 
1425 (1973) (emphasis added). See also Robinson O. Everett, Some Comments on the 
Civilianization of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1980, at 1 (noting that if by 
“civilianization” it meant ignoring the uniqueness of military justice, he was opposed but 
that he favored civilianization if it meant an “acknowledgement that certain basic ethical 
norms apply to the military as well as the civilian”). Cf. Karlen, supra note 9 (questioning 
whether military justice system should import problems often encountered in civilian 
system). 
143 Recently, there have been suggestions that the prosecution of sexual assault offenses 
by servicemembers should be handled by civilian prosecutors. Statement by Professor 
Beth Hillman before the Civil Rights Commission, January 11, 2013, available at 
http://www.c-span.org/Events/Military-Commission-Holds-Forum-on-Sexual-
Assault/10737437187/. Professor Hillman states that when compared to military justice 
systems in other countries, the United States’ system is an “outlier.” Id. 
144 United States v, Ralston, 24 M.J. 709, 711 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (appendix to opinion). 
See also Cox, supra note 2, at 28–30 (commenting on the civilianization of military 
justice). 
42                  MILITARY LAW REVIEW         [Vol. 215 
 
justice system145 and to stress the important role of military judges.146 In 
addition, it reflects the growing role of the appellate courts in 
interpreting, and at times expanding, the due process protections 
available to an accused servicemember. In commenting on the role of the 
Court of Military Appeals in the 1970’s, then-Captain John Cooke 
summarized this theme by observing: 
 
[T]he court has substantially shifted the balance of 
power in the system by invalidating or restricting powers 
previously exercised by commanders and other line 
personnel, and by depositing greater ultimate authority 
in the hands of lawyers and judges. More subtly, the 
court has endeavored to adjust the attitudes with which 
all participants in the system exercise their particular 
authority.147 
 
 
T. The “Can’t Get No Respect” Theme 
 
As demonstrated by some of the themes presented in this section, 
critics of the military justice system often show a complete lack of 
respect for its purpose, content, or operation. As one writer has observed: 
 
The true depth and breadth of the [criticisms] is 
unknown. As far as I know, no recent national surveys 
have been conducted among the citizenry about their 
perceptions or feelings about military justice. 
Nevertheless, I do feel safe in believing that a broad 
cross-section of intelligent people either know very little 
about military justice or, if they do know something 
                                                 
145 Major Donald W. Hansen, Judicial Functions of the Commander, 41 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(1968); Victor M. Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and the Role of the 
Military Commander: What Should the United States Learn from This Revolution? 16 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 419, 423 (2008).  
146 Henry A. Cretella & Norman B. Lynch, The Military Judge: Military or Judge, 9 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 57 (1972) (discussing evolution of military judge’s role); Major Fansu Ku, 
From Law Member to Military Judge: The Continuing Evolution of an Independent Trial 
Judiciary in the Twenty-First Century, 199 MIL. L. REV. 49 (2009) (suggesting methods 
of cultivating judicial independence); Major Gilbert D. Stevenson, The Inherent Authority 
of the Military Judge, 17 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1975) (discussing emerging importance of 
military judges); Westmoreland & Prugh, supra note 12, at 18 (discussing role of military 
judges). 
147 Cooke, supra note 112, at 44. 
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about the system, they believe that it is still in the dark 
ages, void of any full legal recognition, and certainly not 
deserving of a full membership in the family of 
enlightened jurisprudence. Clearly, it does not deserve 
“respect.”148 
 
 
U. The “No Perfect Solution” Theme 
 
The final theme reflects the view that while everyone understands 
the importance of striking some sort of balance between discipline and 
justice, there is no real solution. For example, in his statement to the 
House Armed Services Subcommittee on the proposed UCMJ, Secretary 
of Defense James Forrestal addressed the process of drafting the 
proposed code: He stated: 
 
Another problem faced by the [special committee 
charged with preparing a draft of the code] was to devise 
a code which would insure the maximum amount of 
justice within the framework of a military organization. 
We are all aware of the number of criticisms which have 
been leveled against the court-martial system over the 
years . . . .The point of proper accommodation between 
the meting out of justice and the performance of military 
operations—which involved not only the fighting, but 
also the winning of wars—is one which no one has 
discovered.  I do not know of any expert on the subject—
military or civilian—who can be said to have the perfect 
solution. Suffice it to say, we are striving for maximum 
military performance and maximum justice. I believe the 
proposed code is the nearest approach to those ideals.149  
 
 
  
                                                 
148 David A. Schlueter, The Twentieth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military 
Justice for the 1990's—A Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 
(1991) (emphasis added). 
149 Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
Armed Services, 81st Cong. 597 (Mar. 7, 1949) (statement of James Forrestal, Secretary 
of Defense) (emphasis added), available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/13963097 
?n=4875&printThumbnails=no. 
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V. Summary of Thematic Approaches 
 
The foregoing themes reflect a variety of approaches to the military 
justice conundrum.  They cover more than a hundred years of 
commentary on the American military justice system. While the theme of 
“discipline” seems to have dominated the discussion in the early and 
mid-years of the system, more recent court decisions and commentaries 
seem to favor the “justice” component.150 
 
There are several reasons for that. First, since the nineteenth century, 
but especially since the 1930s, there has been a movement in the United 
States to codify the country’s legal systems. That is, there has been a 
move to codify a growing body of law, such as state criminal law and the 
Federal Rules of Procedure and Evidence.151 The expansion of rules, in 
turn, tends to emphasize procedural due process concerns in both civil 
and criminal procedure. The military justice system reflects that trend.  
While the UCMJ has remained fairly static, the MCM has grown in scope 
and coverage exponentially. 
 
Second, the shift in themes reflects the reality that the CAAF and the 
service Courts of Criminal Appeals have played a strong and persistent 
role in the factual and legal review of courts-martial. This was especially 
so during the 1970s when the then Court of Military Appeals took bold 
                                                 
150 See generally Ferris, supra note 8, at 442–52 (noting the that history of the court-
martial reflects an evolution from discipline to justice). 
151 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 83–86 (1977) (noting process of 
adopting Uniform Commercial Code); Colin Miller, Virginia to Codify Its Rules of 
Evidence Effective July 1, 2012, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/04/virginia-to-codify-its-rules-of-
evidence-effective-july-1-2012.html (noting that Virginia was codifying its common-law 
rules of evidence effective July 1, 2012, leaving Massachusetts as the last state not to 
have done so); Fred L. Borch, The Military Rules of Evidence: A Short History of Their 
Origin and Adoption at Courts-Martial, ARMY LAW., June 2012, at 1, 1 (noting that the 
adoption of the Military Rules of Evidence was driven by the codification of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975); Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American 
Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine form Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 757–66, 809–10 (2003) (discussing the codification movement 
in criminal law); Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s 
Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098 passim (1978) (tracing the movement in the 
United Kingdom and the United States from Jeremy Bentham’s writings in the nineteenth 
century).  
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steps to engraft civilian due process standards on the military justice 
system.152 
 
Finally, Department of Defense and military lawyers have played an 
increasingly important role in crafting policies and procedures which 
reflect concern about ensuring that the military justice system does not 
become simply a system of discipline.153 
 
Regardless of the reasons for the shift, the foregoing themes present 
a somewhat abstract view of the military justice conundrum. Terms such 
as “indispensible,” “delicate balance,” “justice,” and even the term 
“discipline” are abbreviated sound bites or metaphors that might be used 
in any discussion about military justice. But there are other ways of 
analyzing and answering the conundrum. 
 
 
V. The Crime Control and Due Process Models’ Approach to the 
Conundrum 
 
A. In General 
 
In analyzing the military justice conundrum, it is helpful to draw 
from those commentators who have conducted similar analyses of the 
civilian criminal justice system. One of the leading commentators on this 
subject is Professor Herbert L. Packer, who constructed two models for 
analyzing the purposes and functions of a criminal justice system.154 In 
                                                 
152 See LURIE, supra note 89, at 247 (noting that Chief Judge Fletcher had stated in an 
interview with the Army Times in November 1977 that the Court of Military Appeals 
was interested in civilianizing military justice); Major Andrew W. Flor, Post-Trial Delay: 
The Möbius Strip Path, ARMY LAW., June 2011, at 4, 7–9 (noting that in the late 1970s, 
the Court of Military Appeals began sua sponte dismissing cases with prejudice if the 
convening authority took more than ninety days after conviction to take action, so as to 
enforce constitutional speedy trial rights). 
153 See Cooke, supra note 120, at 6 (noting that armed forces lawyers “have the 
responsibility to manage and mold the system so that it serves the needs and expectations 
of the American people and their sons and daughters in the armed forces”); Eugene 
Fidell, The Culture of Change in Military Law, 126 MIL. L. REV. 125, 130–31 (1989) 
(commenting on key role of armed forces lawyers in effecting change in the military 
justice system); Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, Today’s Military Advocates: The 
Challenge of Fulfilling Our Nation’s Expectations for a Military Justice System That Is 
Fair and Just, 195 MIL. L. REV. 190, 198 (2008) (commenting on roles of armed forces 
lawyers). 
154 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and 
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his view, the two models reflect the competing perspectives at play in 
such legal systems.155 
 
Packer believed that it was necessary, in his words, to “build a 
model” to better assess the potential for change in the criminal justice 
system and predict its probable direction. To do so, he explained, would 
move from the abstract to reality.156  
 
The first model is the crime control model, which prioritizes the 
ability, and need, of the government to prohibit specified conduct.157 The 
second is the due process model. It upholds those attributes of the system 
which serve as a check on the ability of the government to investigate, 
charge, and try those accused of criminal conduct.158 One commentator 
has described Packer’s two models as follows: 
 
Both models describe a set of values, beliefs, attitudes, 
and ideas about our criminal justice system that are held 
by many legal actors within the system and that are 
reflected in some of its institutions and practices.  Both 
models are prescriptive as well as descriptive. They 
make competing normative claims about the validity of 
procedural functions and the relative weight that should 
be attached to valid procedural objectives when they 
conflict with each other. Finally, both ideologies have 
programmatic content because they suggest doctrinal 
                                                                                                             
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185, 209–13 (1983) (providing a 
critique and reconstruction of Professor Packer’s models). In reconstructing Professor 
Packer’s models, Professor Arenella states that they create an erroneous impression that 
criminal procedure is concerned solely with whether the government or the individual 
should get the advantage in an adversarial proceeding. Id. at 211. See also HERBERT L. 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). Professor Packer’s law review 
article, and later book, were an attempt to provide some perspective on the Supreme 
Court decisions under Chief Justice Warren. Professor Arenella’s work “reconstructed” 
Packer’s two models in addressing the decisions of the Court under Chief Justice Burger. 
See also John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the 
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 360–67 (1970) (examining Packer’s prevailing 
ideology of criminal procedure); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 
158 (1980) (criticizing the Warren and Burger Courts for being erratic in applying 
criminal procedure doctrines), reprinted at 10 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 151. 
155 Packer, supra note 154, at 5. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 9–10. 
158 Id. at 13–14. 
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courses of action that would implement their vision of 
how the process should function. Consequently, both 
ideological models provide a source for legitimate 
arguments that courts may use to shape legal doctrine in 
criminal procedure.159 
 
The following discussion briefly describes the key features of 
Packer’s two models, which can then be used to analyze the military 
justice conundrum. The crime control model translates into the discipline 
component of the military justice system. The due process model 
translates into the justice component.   
 
 
B. The Crime Control (Discipline) Model 
 
The crime control model views the most important function of the 
criminal process to be the repression of criminal conduct.160 The model 
puts a premium on the speed and efficiency with which the process 
operates to punish the guilty.161 Packer describes efficiency as “the 
system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high 
proportion of criminal offenders whose offenses become known.”162 
 
To be efficient and speedy in a system that lacks sufficient resources 
to deal with the vast number of cases that must pass through it, the crime 
control model prefers the informal, ex parte, administrative fact-finding 
of the police and prosecutor to the more cumbersome adversarial 
determination of guilt at trial.163 The model trusts government officials to 
screen out the “probably innocent.”164 The screening process operated by 
police and prosecutors is considered a reliable indicator of probable guilt.  
Those not screened out are presumptively guilty.165 
 
                                                 
159 Arenella, supra note 154, at 189–90. Professor Arenella states, however, that while 
Packer's models identify some of the values furthered by trial adjudication and plea 
bargaining, neither model identifies the specific functions of American criminal 
procedure nor fully explains how these functions would be served or thwarted by a “due 
process” or “crime control” value perspective. Id. at 211. 
160 Packer, supra note 154, at 9. 
161 Id. at 10. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. Packer writes that under this model, “The process must not be cluttered with 
ceremonious rituals that do not advance the progress of a case.” Id. 
164 Id. at 11. 
165 Id. 
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Once a person has been arrested and investigated without being 
found to be probably innocent, or, to put it differently, once a 
determination has been made (by police and prosecutors) that there is 
enough evidence of guilt to permit holding him for further action, then 
all subsequent activity directed toward him is based on the view that he 
is probably guilty. This “presumption of guilt” approach, according to 
Professor Packer, allows the Crime Control Model to deal efficiently 
with large numbers.166 Professor Packer argues that “presumption of 
guilt” in this model is not the opposite of “presumption of innocence.” 
What he calls the “presumption of guilt” is a factual judgment about 
what probably happened (based on implicit trust of government 
officials).  The presumption of innocence, by contrast, is a rule that does 
not depend on probabilities, but requires the accused to be treated as 
innocent until he has been adjudged otherwise. Thus, the presumption of 
innocence directs the government on how to proceed in a case, whereas 
the presumption of guilt predicts the outcome.167 
 
In the military setting, the discipline component takes on attributes 
similar to Professor Packer’s crime control model. The military’s 
screening process generally reflects a desire to expedite investigations of 
alleged misconduct168 and is thorough enough that if the evidence against 
a servicemember is weak, the command is not likely to begin court-
martial procedures. Instead, a commander may choose any number of 
options for dealing with the issue outside the military justice arena.169 
 
 
C. The Due Process (Justice) Model 
 
Packer's due process model concentrates on the problem of how best 
to limit official power over the individual.170 He refers to this model as 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 See, e.g., Mitsie Smith, Adding Force Behind Military Sexual Assault Reform: The 
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Ending Military Sexual Assault, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER, 
L. & SOC. POL’Y 147, 153 (2011) (stating the “essence of military justice is swift 
punishment to ensure discipline”). 
169 Schlueter supra note 20, § 1-8, at 48, discusses various options available to the 
commander.  These include taking no action or administrative action, and “administrative 
action” covers everything from a verbal counseling through extra training to 
administrative reduction in rank or separation from the service. See also MCM, supra 
note 17, R.C.M. 306(c)(1), (2). 
170 Packer, supra note 154, at 14. 
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an “obstacle course.”171 This preoccupation with limiting government 
power reflects the due process model’s concern with “the primacy of the 
individual,” the stigma of the criminal sanction, and the possibilities of 
abuse inherent in official power.172 
 
The concern with government power and its abuses explains why the 
due process model uses the criminal process to police itself by its formal 
commitment to the concept of “legal guilt.”173 Packer explains: 
 
According to this doctrine, an individual is not to be held 
guilty of crime merely on a showing that in all 
probability, based upon reliable evidence, he did 
factually what he is said to have done. Instead, he is to 
be held guilty if and only if these factual determinations 
are made in procedurally regular fashion and by 
authorities acting within competencies duly allocated to 
them. Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even 
though the factual determination is or might be adverse 
to him, if various rules designed to safeguard the 
integrity of the process are not given effect.174 
 
The due process model prefers adversarial adjudication to an 
administrative determination of guilt for two reasons. First, trial 
adjudication is seen as a more reliable fact-finding mechanism. Second, 
the police and prosecutor lack the competence and willingness to apply 
factual guilt-disabling doctrines when they make their administrative 
determination of guilt.175 
 
The due process model limits government power over all suspects, 
including the factually guilty, by forcing the state to prove its case in an 
adjudicative forum that will provide maximum protection to the factually 
innocent and maximum assurance that the state has respected the 
                                                 
171 Id. at 13. 
172 Id. at 16. 
173 Id. See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (rejecting argument that 
because evidence showed the defendant was clearly guilty, he could not complain of a 
lack of due process; “[n]o matter what the evidence was against him, he had the right to 
an impartial judge”). 
174 Packer, supra note 154, at 16. Professor Packer lists the various rules as including 
jurisdiction, venue, statute of limitations, double jeopardy, and criminal responsibility 
(i.e., the defendant must not be insane or underage). Id. at 16–17. 
175 Id. at 15.  
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defendant's rights in securing its evidence and proving its case.176 
 
In the military context, the concept of a justice or a justice-based 
system describes this model.177 It generally reflects a distrust of a 
commander’s powers and recognition of the potential for abuse. Under 
Packer’s approach, the procedural protections available to a 
servicemember charged with a crime fall within this model.  The 
“justice” approach to military justice might better be referred to as the 
“due process” approach—the latter term better describes what is really at 
stake.  However, this article will continue to apply the term “justice,” as 
that is the term usually used in discussing military criminal procedures. 
 
 
D. Summary of the Models 
 
The following chart provides a summary of the two models for 
analyzing the military justice conundrum. 
 
 
Crime Control—Discipline Due Process—Justice 
 
Efficient and Speedy 
 
Efficiency Not Critical 
 
Factual Guilt 
 
Legal Guilt 
 
Nonadversarial Procedures 
 
Adversarial Procedures 
 
Trust Government to Screen 
 
Limits on Government’s Function in  
Acting as Screener 
 
Primacy of Public Interest 
 
Primacy of Individual 
 
 
E. Application of the Models to the Military Justice System 
 
The following discussion applies the foregoing models to the current 
military justice system. The first section focuses on those features of the 
system that reflect concern about maintaining discipline. The second 
                                                 
176 Id. at 14. 
177 In fact, we might better refer to it as the due process model—it better describes what is 
really at stake. 
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section focuses on those features that reflect concern about providing 
justice. 
 
Not every aspect of military justice is addressed here. This 
discussion focuses on those features that are most readily identified with 
one model or the other. Even so, it will be apparent that some features, 
like the military’s guilty plea procedures, reflect both models. 
 
 
1. Features That Reflect the Crime-Control-Discipline Model 
 
a. In General 
 
From the beginning, the Articles of War and then the UCMJ focused 
on the military commander’s ability to maintain good order and 
discipline by imposing disciplinary measures on members of their 
command. The primary vehicle was trial by court-martial. Military law 
now also includes more informal measures, such as nonjudicial 
punishment under Article 15. 
 
The Code contains several features that reflect the crime control-
discipline model. 
 
 
b. Court-Martial Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Normally, in applying the crime control and due process models, 
commentators focus on the procedural aspects of criminal justice 
systems. But the fact that Congress has provided for court-martial 
jurisdiction over a wide range of individuals, including civilians,178 
                                                 
178 UCMJ art. 2(a)(10) (2012). In 2006, Congress amended Article 2 to provide for court-
martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the 
field, during times of war or contingency operations. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 
256, 263–65 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (detailing how the accused was a non-US citizen, civilian 
interpreter, working in Iraq for the military; he was court-martialed for committing the 
offenses of false official statement, wrongful appropriation, and impeding an 
investigation in the field during Operation Iraqi Freedom). See generally Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles T. Kirchmaier, Command Authority Over Contractors Serving with or 
Accompanying the Force, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2009, at 35, 39–41 (examining command 
authority over contractors); Major Joseph R. Perlak, The Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Implications for Contractor Personnel, 169 MIL. L. REV. 92, 
105–06 (2001) (noting that under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 
Department of Defense personnel may arrest civilians for crimes committed in certain 
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reflects the crime control model in the UCMJ and the ability of the 
commander to regulate and if necessary, punish, behavior that is 
considered a threat to good order and discipline. Just within the last 
decade Congress has taken steps to fill what it perceived to be 
jurisdictional gaps.179 Thus, rather than restricting the commander’s 
authority to enforce crime control within his or her area of operations, 
Congress has actually expanded that authority180—thus rejecting civil 
libertarian arguments that civilians should not be subjected to court-
martial jurisdiction. 
 
 
c. Defining Military Offenses 
 
Perhaps one of the most striking features of the current military 
justice system is in the substantive law aspects of the UCMJ. Articles 77 
through 134 are considered the “punitive articles”181 and proscribe 
criminal offenses.    
 
The punitive articles include offenses that are clearly related to good 
order and discipline, such as disobedience of orders,182 desertion,183 
                                                                                                             
areas, and a commander has considerable discretion about whether to turn these civilians 
over to foreign authorities). 
179 UCMJ art. 2(a)(10) (2012) (jurisdiction over civilians); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 
(offenses committed overseas).   
180 See Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ Criminal 
Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1059–67 (2010) 
(recommending that military law should be used to hold private civilian contractors 
criminally accountable under UCMJ); Matthew Dahl, “Runaway Train”: Controlling 
Crimes Committed by Private Contractors Through Application of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, 14 BARRY L. REV. 55, 77 (2010) (endorsing amendment to Article 
2(a)(10), UCMJ, as necessary for controlling crimes committed by private contractors 
and other civilians accompanying U.S. armed forces overseas); David A. Schlueter, 
Court-Martial Jurisdiction: An Expansion of the Least Possible Power, 73 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 74, 78–80 (1982) (discussing 1979 amendment to Article 2, UCMJ, 
codifying doctrine of constructive enlistments); Cf. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing 
Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battlefield: A Proposal for a More Legitimate 
Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilian Augmentees, 62 
U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 491, 497–98 (2008) (arguing that military’s interests did not justify 
extension of jurisdiction over civilians by Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 
2000 and amendment to Article 2a(10), UCMJ). 
181 See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, CHARLES H. ROSE, VICTOR HANSEN & CHRISTOPHER 
BEHAN, MILITARY CRIMES AND DEFENSES, § 3-1[5], at 50 (2d ed. 2012). 
182 UCMJ art. 92 (2012).  
183 Id. art. 85 (2012). 
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disrespect,184 insubordination,185 and mutiny.186 The military-related 
offenses also include the sometimes maligned general articles—Articles 
133 and 134.  These articles epitomize the discipline-crime control 
model of criminal law, because they hold a servicemember criminally 
responsible for actions that are not always specifically proscribed by 
law.187  The military courts have held, however, that an accused must 
have been on fair notice that his actions violated a statute, regulation, or 
even custom of the service.188 
 
The UCMJ also includes civilian offenses such as murder,189 
robbery,190 and forgery.191 The Supreme Court has abolished its prior 
“service connection” test, and held that the military can punish any 
violation of the UCMJ—just as long as the accused is personally subject 
to its jurisdiction.192  While the nexus between the commander’s ability 
to punish a servicemember for violating a lawful order and the need to 
maintain discipline is more readily apparent, the same nexus often exits 
when a “civilian” offense is involved, and the commander does not need 
to demonstrate that it does in order to exercise his or her jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
184 Id. art. 86 (2012). 
185 Id. art. 91 (2012). 
186 Id. art. 94 (2012). 
187 Thus, in United States v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343, 345–46 (C.M.A. 1964), the Court 
of Military Appeals upheld a conviction for jumping from the deck of an aircraft carrier 
into the sea—conduct that had not been specifically proscribed either by law or 
regulation.  “To superimpose a requirement that the conduct be prohibited by some order, 
regulation, or statute in order to fall within the proscription of . . . Article 134 would be 
contrary to the clear and fair meaning of its terms.” Id. at 346.  Afterwards, the President 
added “Jumping from Vessel into the Water” as an enumerated offense under Article 134.  
MCM, supra note 17, at A23–24. 
188 See SCHLUETER, ROSE, HANSEN & BEHAN, supra note 181, § 7-3[3][c][i] (discussing 
requirement that accused must be on fair notice that his conduct is chargeable as a 
violation of Article 134). 
189 UCMJ, art. 118 (2012). 
190 Id. art. 122. 
191 Id. art. 123. The process of adding “civilian-type” offenses to military law was a 
gradual one.  The Articles of War did not cover “civilian-type” crimes until 1863, and the 
process of including them was not complete until the UCMJ was adopted in 1951.  Thus, 
under the Articles of War, murder and rape cases could not be tried at court-martial if the 
crime was alleged to have happened in the American homeland during peacetime. 
Sherman, supra note 9, at 39. 
192 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 451 (1987), overruling O’Callahan v. Parker, 
395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969). 
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Consider the following examples193:  
 
 First, the servicemember is charged with throwing butter 
onto the ceiling of a mess hall, a violation of Article 134.194 
At first blush this offense seems so trivial to be ignored.  
Yet, commanders are constantly faced with minor delicts 
that threaten the good order and discipline of a unit and 
could, if left unaddressed, lead to additional delicts and a 
lack of respect for command authority. It is important to note 
that although this offense, standing alone, would normally 
not give rise to a court-martial, at its core, the commander 
should have the authority to take disciplinary action, whether 
it be in the form of a reprimand, nonjudicial punishment, or a 
court-martial. 
 
 Second, a servicemember is charged under Article 118 with 
killing servicemembers and civilians at an off-base 
convenience store.195 The command’s interest in crime 
control is clear in this instance. But the command also must 
have the authority to deal with this horrific offense under the 
UCMJ. Servicemembers are involved and the need to 
maintain good order may depend heavily on how the 
command handles the killings.196 
 
 Third, a civilian contractor, working overseas for the 
military, is charged with sexual assault of a servicemember 
under Article 120.197 As noted supra, in 2006, Congress 
amended Article 2 of the UCMJ to provide for court-martial 
jurisdiction over “persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field” during “contingency operations.” 
                                                 
193 It is assumed in these examples that the military has appropriate personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction over the servicemember. 
194 See United States v. Regan, 11 M.J. 745 (A.C.M.R. 1981). In Regan, the accused was 
charged with various offenses, including throwing butter onto the mess hall ceiling. The 
court concluded that the specification alleging the behavior failed to include the requisite 
words of criminality, e.g., failure to allege that the accused’s conduct was “disorderly.” 
Interestingly, the court did not conclude that the accused’s actions could not be 
considered a violation of the UCMJ.  
195 UCMJ art. 118 (2012). 
196 Even assuming the command has a very high interest in handling a murder case, there 
may be an existing agreement with local authorities that requires that all murders be 
handled in the state or federal courts. 
197  UCMJ, art. 120 (2012). 
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Congress apparently believed that the need to control 
criminal activity by civilians accompanying the military was 
important enough to entrust that power to do so in a military 
commander. 
 
 Finally, a servicemember is charged with violating a no-
contact order under Article 92.198 This offense, while raising 
issues of the ability of a commander to infringe on a 
servicemember’s liberty interests,199 reflects the view that in 
order to maintain good order and discipline, even if not 
strictly criminal activity, a commander should be able to 
order a servicemember to avoid contact which might in turn 
lead to criminal activity or other threats to the unit. 
 
In each of the foregoing examples, the Congress has recognized that 
it is critical that the commander have the ability to address a wide range 
of misconduct—some of which would not be a crime in a civilian 
setting—in order to maintain good order and discipline. 
 
 
d. Role of the Commander 
 
The commander’s role in military justice perhaps best reflects the 
crime control and discipline model, and prevents it from being viewed as 
a truly justice-based system. Critics and supporters of military justice 
have one thing in common. They recognize the pivotal role of the 
commander as a feature that distinguishes the military and civilian 
systems of criminal justice.200 This role reflects the broad trust in the 
                                                 
198 Id. art. 92. 
199 See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 13-3(O)(5), at 728–32 (discussing rights of privacy 
in the military setting). 
200 Weiss v. United States, 510 U. S. 163, 175 (1994) (listing the powers of the military 
commander and concluding that “by contrast to civilian society, nonjudicial military 
officers play a significant part in the administration of military justice”). See generally 
Alleman, supra note 97; Brigadier General Paul R. Dordal, The Military Criminal Justice 
System: A Commander’s Perspective, THE REPORTER, June 1997, at 3; Hansen, supra 
note 145, at 423 (“First and foremost, military justice is one of the primary tools a 
military commander has to maintain discipline within the ranks.” But “it is not the be all 
and end all of military justice, particularly in a democracy.”); William Westmoreland, 
Military Justice—A Commander’s Viewpoint, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 5 (1971). 
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judgment of government officials that characterizes the crime control 
model.201  
 
A brief review of the commander’s broad powers makes the point. 
First, the commander has very broad discretion to conduct investigations 
into allegations of misconduct.202 The actual investigations are almost 
always conducted either by the law enforcement branches of the armed 
forces, who in turn report their findings to the commander, or by 
investigating officers appointed by the commander himself. The 
commander’s powers include the authority to authorize searches and 
seizures, conduct inspections, and question suspects. While the 
commander’s authority to do so is limited by the MCM and judicial 
opinions, the power is nonetheless broad and reflective of the crime 
control and discipline models.   
 
Second, the commander has broad prosecutorial discretion.203 
Commanders, not lawyers, ultimately decide whether to take 
administrative actions, impose nonjudicial punishment, or commence 
court-martial proceedings.  If a commander, after receiving legal advice 
and the advice and recommendations of subordinate commanders, 
decides to convene a court-martial, the commander personally selects the 
members of the court-martial panel.204 This controversial feature of the 
military justice system draws support,205 criticism,206 and calls for 
                                                 
201 In Professor Packer’s formulation, these officials may be police or prosecutors; in 
military justice, they are commanders.  
202 See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 5-2, at 265–66. 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 365 (C.M.A. 1983) (stating the 
“convening authority . . . is free to decide the number of offenses to charge . . .”); United 
States v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1987) (noting that courts are hesitant to review 
decisions whether to prosecute; there is a strong presumption that convening authorities 
perform their function without bias); See also SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 6-1[A], at 
355–61 (discussing commander’s discretion). 
204 UCMJ art. 25 (2012). Timothy W. Murphy, A Defense of the Role of the Convening 
Authority: The Integration of Justice and Discipline, 28 THE REPORTER No. 3, at 3 
(2001). The composition of the court-martial panel itself, quite aside from the 
commander’s role in choosing it, manifests the crime control model.  The panel always 
consists of servicemembers senior to the accused, whether officers or enlisted. If the 
accused requests that enlisted members be appointed to the court, the convening authority 
appoints noncomissioned officers from the command. Thus, regardless of whether the 
case is judge alone or panel, the accused’s fate is decided by government officials (in the 
form of military leaders), and not by private citizens.  Because the crime control model 
includes “trust in the judgment of government officials” the composition issue is a 
manifestation of that model. 
205 See Christopher Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape: In Defense of Convening 
Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REV. 
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reform.207 One popular proposal is to adopt a random system of selecting 
the members.208 Nonetheless, the system remains intact. Third, after the 
court-martial is convened, the commander may decide such questions as 
to whether to grant immunity to witnesses, and whether to provide 
witnesses and expert assistance to the defense.209 Again, although those 
                                                                                                             
190 (2003) (offering a strong defense for the current system of selecting court members); 
Charles W. Schiesser, Trial by Peers: Enlisted Members on Courts-Martial, 15 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 171 (1966) (stating the system is an ethical and pragmatic success). 
206 Major Guy P. Glazier, He Called for His Pipe, and He Called for His Bowl, and He 
Called for His Members Three—Selection of Military Juries by the Sovereign: 
Impediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (criticizing process). 
207 See Major R. Rex Brookshire, Juror Selection Under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice: Fact and Fiction, 58 MIL. L. REV. 71 (1972) (proposing reforms); Frank J. 
Chmelik, The Military Justice System and the Right to Trial by Jury: Size and Voting 
Requirements of the General Court-Martial for Service-Connected Civilian Offenses, 8 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 617 (1981) (discussing Sixth Amendment right to jury trial 
should apply for non-military offenses); Victor M. Hansen, Avoiding the Extremes: A 
Proposal for Modifying Court Member Selection in the Military, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
911 (2011) (proposing a change to the military’s panel selection system by using the 
accused’s peremptory challenges to address the unfairness of stacking a court-martial 
panel); Major James T. Hill, Applying Transparency in the Military Panel Selection 
Process with the Preselection Method, 205 MIL. L. REV. 117 (2010) (recommending new 
system for selecting members); Major Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-Martial Panel 
Selection Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103 (1992) (proposing reforms); 
Daniel Maurer, The Unrepresentative Military Jury: Deliberate Inclusion of Combat 
Veterans in the Military’s Venire for Combat-Incidental Crimes, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
803 (2009) (recommending greater inclusion of combat servicemembers in cases 
involving combat-related charges); Major Gary C. Smallridge, The Military Jury 
Selection Reform Movement, 19 A.F. L. REV. 343 (1977) (discussing proposed reforms); 
Dwight W. Sullivan, Playing the Numbers Game: Court-Martial Panel Size and the 
Military Death Penalty, 158 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (proposing changes). 
208 See Matthew J. McCormack, Reforming Court-Martial Panel Selection: Why Change 
Makes Sense for Military Commanders and Military Justice, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013 
(1999) (recommending adoption of random selection process); Joseph Remcho, Military 
Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J. 193 (1973) 
(concluding that there would be little or no loss to discipline if the military adopted a 
random process of selecting members); Captain John D. VanSant, Trial by Jury of 
Military Peers, 15 A.F. L. REV. 185 (1973) (proposing random selection); Colonel James 
A. Young, Revising the Court-Martial Selection Process, 163 MIL. L. REV. 91 (2000) 
(recommending random selection process). 
209 However, a military judge may order the Government to provide expert assistance 
even if the commander refuses, and under Rule for Courts-Martial 703 may enforce the 
order with abatement if the Government refuses.  See Major Dan Dalrymple, Make the 
Most of It: How Defense Counsel Needing Expert Assistance Can Access Existing 
Government Resources, ARMY LAW., May 2013, at 35, 35 & n.6.  A military judge may 
also order the live production of other witnesses, even if it is not militarily convenient for 
the commander to produce them.  United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 610–11 
(N.M.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94, 95–96 (C.M.A. 1977). 
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decisions are subject to judicial review, the commander’s authority to be 
involved in that process is broad. 
 
Finally, commanders have broad post-trial powers and duties. 
Following a court-martial conviction, the commander who convened the 
court-martial is charged with, among other things, reviewing the results, 
considering any post-trial clemency matters the servicemember may have 
submitted, and deciding whether to approve the findings and the 
sentence.210  
 
A commander’s broad powers can lead to serious problems if a 
commander unlawfully exercises influence on the system. As noted 
above, the crime control model places trust in the ability of law 
enforcement personnel and prosecutors to efficiently and speedily 
resolve alleged criminal activity. While the military justice systems place 
some trust in the commanders to function similarly, unfettered discretion 
and power can tempt the commander to “fix” the outcome of a case 
being processed in the system. To that end, Article 37 of the UCMJ 
expressly forbids commanders, and others, from exercising unlawful 
influence on a case.211 And Article 98 makes it an offense to not 
promptly dispose of charges or to enforce any provision in the UCMJ.212 
Unlawful command influence is considered the “mortal enemy of 
military justice,”213 and the authorities that establish it check the 
commander’s power in accordance with the due process model of 
criminal law.  However, in general, the commander’s broad discretion is 
a “crime control” rather than a “due process” feature of military justice.  
 
Ultimately, it is the commanders, not the lawyers or the judges, who 
are responsible for good order and discipline in the Armed Forces. 
 
 
  
                                                 
210 The system recognizes that at the end of the day, the case goes back to where it 
started—on the commander's desk: To ensure that the system works.  
211 UCMJ art. 37 (2012). 
212 Id. art. 98.  
213 United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). See generally SCHLUETER, 
supra note 20, § 6-3, at 387–15 (discussing command influence). 
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e. Nonjudicial Punishment 
 
Another feature that clearly reflects the crime control-discipline 
model is Article 15 of the UCMJ.214 That provision authorizes 
commanders to impose nonjudicial punishment on members of their 
commands for minor offenses.215 The Supreme Court has recognized 
these procedures as administrative in nature216 and Congress has 
recognized that using nonjudicial punishment reduces the number of 
courts-martial for minor offenses that affect discipline.217  
 
Under Professor Packer’s crime control model, administrative 
procedures in a criminal justice system can efficiently and quickly 
dispose of criminal allegations and reduce the need for adversarial 
proceedings.218 Nonjudicial punishment procedures fit hand-in-glove 
with that model. Because of their summary nature—where only minimal 
due process is provided219—nonjudicial punishment procedures have 
been challenged as being unconstitutional.220 
                                                 
214 UCMJ art. 15 (2012). Various terms are used for this procedure. In the Air Force and 
Army, it is referred to as an “Article 15,” in the Coast Guard and Navy, “Captain’s 
Mast,” and in Marine Corps, “Office Hours.” See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, §§ 3-5(A), 
3-5(C), 3-5(D), and 3-5(E). 
215 See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 3 (discussing nonjudicial punishment 
procedures in the armed forces); Captain Harold L. Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 
MIL. L. REV. 37 (1965) (reviewing the history of nonjudicial punishment and discussing 
the fact that it is a much-needed disciplinary tool). See also Burress M. Carnahan, 
Comment—Article 15 Punishments, 13 A.F. JAG L. REV. 270 (1971) (discussing Air 
Force Article 15 procedures); Dwight Sullivan, Overhauling the Vessel Exception, 43 
NAVAL L. REV. 57 (1996) (discussing extensively the vessel exception).  
216 See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31–31 (1976) (stating that nonjudicial 
punishment is an administrative method of dealing with minor offenses). 
217 See S. REP. NO. 1911, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2379, 
2380–82: 
Article 15 . . . provides a means whereby military 
commanders may impose nonjudicial punishment for minor 
infractions of discipline. Its use permits the services to 
reduce substantially the number of courts-martial for minor 
offenses, which result in stigmatizing and impairing the 
efficiency and morale of the person concerned.  
Id. 
218 Packer, supra note 154, at 13. Professor Packer’s thesis is that unencumbered 
administrative fact-finding, similar to a guilty plea, can reduce adjudicative proceedings. 
Id.   
219 Each of the services provide guidance to commanders on imposing nonjudicial 
punishment. In each service, to one degree or another, a servicemember receives notice of 
the pending proceeding, the right to consult with an attorney, a nonadversarial hearing 
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f. Guilty Pleas 
 
In developing his two models for analyzing the criminal justice 
system, Professor Packer highlighted plea bargaining and guilty pleas as 
a prime example of the crime control model. In his view, the desire to 
use the criminal justice system to control crime was best reflected in the 
ability of the system to deal quickly and efficiently by permitting a 
defendant to plead guilty. He writes: 
 
The pure Crime Control Model has very little use for 
many conspicuous features of the adjudicative process 
and in real life works a number of ingenious 
compromises with it. Even in the pure model, however, 
there have to be devices for dealing with the suspect 
after the preliminary screening process has resulted in a 
determination of probable guilt. The focal device, as we 
shall see, is the plea of guilty; through its use 
adjudicative fact-finding is reduced to a minimum. It 
might be said of the Crime Control Model that, reduced 
to its barest essentials and when operating at its most 
successful pitch, it consists of two elements: (a) an 
administrative fact-finding process leading to 
exoneration of the suspect, or to (b) the entry of a plea of 
guilty.221 
 
Critics of this view point out that Professor Packer’s recognition of 
the finality and efficiency of plea bargaining and guilty pleas does not 
demonstrate that guilty pleas promote criminal law objectives any better 
than trials.222  
 
                                                                                                             
before the commander (conducted by the commander), the right to demand a trial in lieu 
of the nonjudicial punishment (unless the servicemember is attached to embarked on, a 
vessel), and the right to appeal the punishment to a superior commander.  
220 See Note, The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973) 
(taking position that servicemember faces dilemma of accepting punishment or 
demanding trial where constitutional protections would be available); Edward J. 
Imwinkelried & Francis A. Gilligan, The Constitutionality of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 
YALE L.J. 534 (1974) (rejecting arguments that Article 15 procedures are 
unconstitutional). 
221 Packer, supra note 154, at 13. See also Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a 
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 316–17 (1983) (asserting that because of 
variables in an adjudicary proceeding, trials cannot convey “truth” with regularity). 
222 Arenella, supra note 154, at 216–17. 
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Court-martial charges against servicemembers typically result in plea 
bargaining between the commander and the accused and entry of a guilty 
plea in return, for example, for a reduced charge or sentence.223 Thus, the 
military’s practice of permitting plea bargaining and guilty pleas reflects 
the crime control-discipline model. It permits the system to assign guilt, 
sentence the offender, and send a signal to others in the command that 
such conduct is not tolerated, with a minimum of administrative 
difficulty (unless the Government is seeking the death penalty, in which 
case a guilty plea is not allowed). 
 
On the other hand, there are real dangers lurking in taking guilty 
pleas from accused servicemembers who may not fully appreciate their 
options or otherwise feel the pressure from the command to plead guilty. 
To guard against coerced or uniformed guilty pleas, the military judge 
must first conduct a full inquiry into the basis of the plea224 and an 
inquiry into any pretrial agreement between the commander and the 
accused.225  Those requirements are thus due process limits on a feature 
of military justice which reflects the crime control-discipline model. 
 
 
g. Nonunanimous Verdicts 
 
In the military justice system, only a two-thirds vote of the court-
martial members is required to convict, unless the case is being tried as a 
capital case.226 The verdict is set by the first vote of the members, which 
is by secret written ballot.227 Thus, there are no hung juries in military 
practice. This feature furthers the crime control-discipline model in two 
ways. First, the prosecution need not convince all of the members of the 
                                                 
223 See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, ch. 9 (discussing pretrial agreements), ch. 14 
(discussing entry of guilty pleas). 
224 United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969). This inquiry is referred to as the 
Care providency inquiry.  The “paternalistic” thoroughness of this process has been 
criticized on the grounds that it places too great a burden on Military Judges and counsel 
to extract all the necessary facts from the accused.  Major Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea 
Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 195, 240 (1991).  This critique thus 
represents a crime control-discipline response to a due process-justice practice, 
advocating greater trust in the trial judge and fewer “formalities” before finding the 
accused guilty.   
225 United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453 
(C.M.A. 1976). 
226 UCMJ art. 52 (2012). 
227 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 921(c). The MCM provides for procedures for 
reconsideration of a verdict by the members. Id. R.C.M. 924. 
62                  MILITARY LAW REVIEW         [Vol. 215 
 
court-martial that an accused is guilty. Thus, the chances of a conviction 
seem higher. Second, this rule reflects efficiency, one of the features of 
the crime control model—even if the trial ends in an acquittal. 
 
 
h. Sentencing 
 
If an accused is convicted by a court-martial, either a military judge 
or the court-martial members who found the accused guilty, decide the 
sentence. The presentencing phase of trial typically happens immediately 
after guilty findings are announced, on the same day or the next day; 
there is no delay while presentencing reports are prepared or additional 
evidence is gathered.  The commander who sent the case to the court-
martial does not set the sentence. During sentencing, an accused is 
permitted to introduce evidence in extenuation and mitigation, and may 
make an unsworn statement. The type and amount of maximum 
punishment that may be imposed are generally determined by the 
jurisdictional limits of the court-martial involved228 the nature of the 
proceeding,229 and limits spelled out in the MCM.230  The sentencing 
authority’s discretion is otherwise unfettered; there are no “sentencing 
guidelines” and (except in certain very serious cases) no mandatory 
minimum sentences.231     
 
In arguing for an appropriate sentence, the prosecution may make a 
general deterrence argument—which reflects the commander’s interest in 
deterring others in the command from engaging in the same sort of 
behavior.232 However, as noted at Part V.E.2.i below, some features of 
the sentencing process clearly reflect the due process approach. 
 
                                                 
228 SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 16-2(B) at 983-84 (discussing jurisdictional limits on 
punishments). 
229 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 810(d) (limits on punishments in rehearings, new trials, 
and other trials). 
230 Id. pt. IV. Part IV of the MCM lists the various punitive articles and the maximum 
sentence that may be imposed for each offense. In addition, the MCM includes 
“escalator” provisions. See id. R.C.M. 1003(d). 
231 Colonel Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Court-Martial Sentencing With Members: A Shot in the 
Dark?, 35 THE REPORTER 33, 34 (2008) (the minimum sentence for certain types of 
murder is life; the minimum sentence for spying is death). 
232 See United States v. Meeks, 41 M.J. 150, 158–59 (C.M.A. 1994) (holding prosecutor’s 
argument was fair comment on preserving good order and discipline and general 
deterrence). Deterrence is one of several utilitarian justifications for punishment. See 
PACKER, supra note 154, at 39–45. 
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2. Features That Reflect the Due Process-Justice Model 
 
a. In General 
 
As noted above, a number of commentators have stated that the 
current military justice system is justice based.233 While that point is 
debatable, some features of the military justice system clearly reflect the 
due process-justice model. The following discussion addresses 
substantive and procedural protections. 
 
b. Application of Bill of Rights Protections to Commander’s 
Control of Servicemembers 
 
A commander has considerable control over the lives of 
servicemembers in his or her unit—a feature that reflects the crime 
control-discipline model. But case law recognizes constitutional limits to 
that control, for example, when a commander issues an order that 
infringes on a servicemember’s freedom of speech234 or religion235 or a 
servicemember’s privacy interests.236 Those limits reflect the due process 
(substantive and procedural) justice model. 
 
 
c. Application of the Bill of Rights Protections During Pretrial 
Processing of Cases 
 
During the pretrial investigation and processing of charges, an 
accused benefits from a number of constitutional, statutory, and 
regulatory protections. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies to any interrogations of a suspect or to any request 
to produce incriminating information.237 The Fourth Amendment applies 
to any search and seizure conducted by military or civilian authorities.238 
And the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any eyewitness 
                                                 
233 See Part  IV.D, supra. 
234 SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 13-3(O)(4), at 717–28 (First Amendment rights). 
235 Id. § 13-3(O)(4), at 724–25. 
236 Id. § 13-3(O)(5), at 728–32. 
237 U.S. CONST. amend V; MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 301. The privilege against 
self-incrimination at court-martial is actually older than the Bill of Rights itself, and was 
afforded to Major John André during his Revolutionary War trial for spying. United 
States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967).  
238 U.S. CONST. amend IV; MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 311–17. 
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identification procedures.239  In each of these areas, however, the courts 
have recognized that the demands of good order and discipline may 
prevail.240 
 
 
d. Military Discovery Practices 
 
The military’s pretrial discovery rules clearly reflect the due process-
justice model.241 First, under Article 46, the accused has discovery rights 
that equal those available to the prosecution. The accused is entitled to 
compulsory process to obtain both military and defense witnesses, 
sometimes at government expense.242 That might include obtaining 
immunity for a defense witness.243 Second, an accused may request that 
the government provide an expert consultant to assist the defense in 
preparing its case244 and to testify at trial on behalf of the accused.245 If 
an expert is assigned to assist the defense, that person becomes part of 
the defense team.246 Third, the accused is entitled to have the prosecution 
automatically disclose the following information: names and contact 
information of prosecution witnesses,247 evidence which is favorable to 
the accused,248 evidence of any prior convictions,249 and evidence of 
                                                 
239 U.S. CONST. amend VI; MCM, supra note 17, MIL. R. EVID. 321. 
240 See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (“the rights of men in the armed 
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and 
duty”). 
241 See generally Ronald S. Thompson, Constitutional Applications to the Military 
Criminal Defendant, 66 U. DETROIT L. REV. 221 (1989) (noting that although 
modifications have been made to substantive constitutional law rights, in order to 
maintain good order and discipline, an accused servicemember has enhanced protections 
in other areas such as discovery and witness production). 
242 Francis A. Gilligan & Frederick Lederer, The Procurement and Presentation of 
Evidence in Courts-Martial: Compulsory Process and Confrontation, 101 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(1983); Major Calvin M. Lederer, Warrants of Attachment—Forcibly Compelling the 
Attendance of Witnesses, 98 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
243 Major Steven W. Myhre, Defense Witness Immunity and the Due Process Standard: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 136 MIL. L. REV. 69 (1992). 
244 United States v. Short, 50 M.J. 370 (C.A.A.F. 1999); Major Will A. Gunn, 
Supplementing the Defense Team: A Primer on Requesting and Obtaining Expert 
Assistance, 39 A.F. L. REV. 143 (1996). 
245 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 703(d). 
246 See SCHLUETER supra note 20, § 11-5, at 589–90 (noting that in that instance, 
communications between the defense and expert consultant may be privileged). 
247 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701. 
248 Id. R.C.M. 701(a)(6); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
249 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(4). 
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statements by the accused,250 evidence seized from the accused,251 and 
evidence of any eyewitness identifications.252 Fourth, if the command 
intends to convene a general court-martial to try an accused, it must first 
hold an Article 32 hearing to determine if there is a basis for the 
charges.253 During that hearing, which is sometimes equated with a 
civilian grand jury,254 the accused is entitled to be present, to present 
evidence, but perhaps more importantly, to hear the testimony of 
witnesses who will likely testify against him at a later trial.255  
Furthermore, even in a special court-martial, “[e]ach party shall have 
adequate opportunity to prepare its case and equal opportunity to 
interview witnesses and inspect evidence. No party may unreasonably 
impede the access of another party to a witness or evidence.”256  Thus, 
unlike in some civilian jurisdictions, the Government may not encourage 
its witnesses to refuse to talk to the defense outside of court.257 
 
In addition, an accused may request production of evidence and 
information such as the results of any tests or reports,258 tangible 
evidence and documents,259 Jencks Act materials,260 and sentencing 
information.261 
                                                 
250 Id. MIL. R. EVID. 304(d)(1). 
251 Id. MIL. R. EVID. 311(d)(1). 
252 Id. MIL. R. EVID.  321(c)(1). 
253 UCMJ art. 32 (2012). See generally Major Larry A. Gaydos, A Comprehensive Guide 
to the Military Pretrial Investigation, 111 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1986) (discussing of Article 
32 procedures); Brian C. Hayes, Strengthening Article 32 to Prevent Politically 
Motivated Prosecution: Moving Military Justice Back to the Cutting Edge, 19 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 173 (2006) (recommending that Congress revise Article 32 to require 
independent establishment of probable cause); Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Murphy, 
The Formal Pretrial Investigation, 12 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1961) (examining Article 32 
procedures). 
254 Lawrence J. Sandell, The Grand Jury and the Article 32: A Comparison, 1 N. KY. ST. 
L.F. 25 (1973) (comparing Article 32 to grand jury). 
255 See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 7-2(C), at 426–31 (discussing accused’s rights at 
Article 32 investigation). 
256 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(e). 
257 See United States v. Irwin, 30 M.J. 87, 93–95 (C.M.A. 1990). 
258 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(B). 
259 Id. R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(A). 
260 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). United States v. Jarrie, 5 M.J. 193 (C.M.A. 1978). See 
generally Don Burnette, Workshopping the Jencks Act, ARMY LAW., June 1987, at 22; 
First Lieutenant Stephen T. Lynch, Possession Under the Jencks Act, 10 A.F. JAG R. 177 
(Dec. 1981); Major Orlan G. Waldrop, The Jencks Act, 20 A.F. L. REV. 93 (1978); Daniel 
Bogart, Jencks Act, 27 JAG J. 427 (1973); Major Luther C. West, Significance of the 
Jencks Act in Military Law, 30 MIL. L. REV. 83 (1965). 
261 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 701(a)(5)(A). 
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These procedural protections strongly reflect the due process-justice 
model in that they are designed to ensure that an accused has access to 
any evidence which he may introduce on his behalf or which may be 
introduced against him at trial by the prosecution.  
 
 
e. Appointment and Role of Counsel 
 
Throughout the military justice system, lawyers play a pervasive and 
essential role. Their participation clearly reflects the due process-justice 
model. Lawyers advise commanders at all levels of command, for 
example on promulgation of lawful orders and policies, pretrial 
investigations,262 decisions concerning prosecutorial discretion, 
responding to defense requests, and post-trial disposition of courts-
martial. 
 
On the defense side, lawyers represent the accused at virtually every 
stage of the proceedings—from pretrial investigation to appellate review. 
Defense counsel are typically assigned to separate legal chains of 
command, so that they are not directly responsible to the local 
commanders.263 
 
The military system takes the role of counsel very seriously. The 
appellate courts review, and act upon, allegations of unprofessional or 
ineffective representation by both the prosecution264 and the defense.265  
 
 
f. Use of Military Judges 
 
Another feature of the military justice system that reflects the due 
process-justice model is the appointment of military judges to preside 
over courts-martial. Their role is critical in ensuring that the rules of 
                                                 
262 Although we usually focus on the appointment of defense counsel, the fact that the 
system involves prosecutors at the early stage to advise commanders is also another 
factor that, whether intended or not, could have justice implications for the defendant. 
Lawyers can be effective in dissuading a commander from proceeding with baseless 
charges that run the risk of demoralizing the command. 
263 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE ch. 6 (3 Oct. 2011) 
(discussing U.S. Army Trial Defense Service). 
264 See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 13-3(N), at 704–08 (discussing prosecutorial 
misconduct). 
265 See id. § 15-2(C)(3), at 835–59 (discussing ineffective assistance of defense counsel).  
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procedure and evidence are applied and enforced. While the commander 
can control what takes place outside the courtroom, it is the judge who is 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that an accused receives a fair 
trial.  
 
 
g. Guilty Plea Inquiries 
 
As noted in Part V.E.1.f, above, the ability of the prosecution and 
defense to efficiently resolve pending charges through entry of a guilty 
plea—most often accompanied by a pretrial agreement—reflects the 
crime control-discipline model. But there are concerns that the 
government may coerce an accused into pleading guilty and thus waive 
important constitutional rights that would be available in a contested 
trial.266 To address that concern, the military courts and the MCM267 
require the military judge to conduct an inquiry into the voluntariness 
and factual basis of a guilty plea.268 In addition, the military judge is 
required to determine if there is any agreement between the accused and 
the commander and, if so, review the agreement to ensure that it 
comports with law and sound policy.269 Failure to conduct the inquiry 
may result in the guilty plea later set aside by an appellate court.270 
Accordingly, the requirement to conduct these inquiries reflects the due 
process-justice model. 
 
 
  
                                                 
266 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The 
Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978) (proposing a new rule 
that would allow a defendant to issue proper notice of his constitutional claims, plead 
guilty, and claim on appeal the violation of those rights); Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1980) (noting that conditional guilty pleas are an appropriate 
compromise between the benefits of the plea bargain system and the need to provide 
defendants with an adequate forum for the consideration of their constitutional claims). 
267 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 910. 
268 United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969). Cf. Elling, supra note 224 
(recommending changing the law so that courts will not be always required to reject a 
guilty plea whenever an inconsistency arises). 
269 United States v. King, 3 M.J. 458 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453 
(C.M.A. 1976). 
270 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 35 M.J. 787 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (guilty plea 
improvident where element of offense was missing). 
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h. Trial Procedures 
 
Virtually every aspect of a court-martial itself reflects the due 
process-justice model. As outlined in Part II.B, supra, an accused is 
entitled to the same protections and rights that exist in federal and state 
criminal trials. The court-martial is an adversarial proceeding and is 
designed, as is its civilian counterpart, to determine whether an accused 
is guilty of the charged offense—both factually and legally. 
While most courts-martial are conducted quickly and efficiently, 
they sometimes reflect what Packer refers to as the “obstacles” of due 
process. For example, a military accused is entitled to file motions to 
dismiss, motions to suppress evidence, motions for appropriate relief, 
and motions for continuances. The motions practice in the current 
military justice system, in keeping with the due process-justice model, 
can slow things down. For commanders and others who are concerned 
about the good order and morale of the military community, the process 
can sometimes be very frustrating—especially if the proceedings are 
protracted.271 
 
 
i. Sentencing 
 
If an accused is convicted by a court-martial, either the military 
judge or the court-martial members who found the accused guilty will 
determine the sentence. During sentencing, the commander’s interest in 
ensuring that the accused does not return to the command (the crime 
control-discipline model) is restricted by two rules: First, prosecution 
witnesses on sentencing are not permitted to testify that in their opinion 
the accused should be discharged.272 Second, the prosecutor may not urge 
the court or the military judge to impose a discharge as part of the 
                                                 
271 For example, the court-martial of Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood has drawn negative 
comments from the surviving victims of that shooting. See, e.g., Jim Forsyth, Trial 
Delays Vex Fort Hood Survivors Three Years Later, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2012, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-04/news/sns-rt-us-usa-crime-fort-hoodbre8a 
403y-20121104_1_major-nidal-hasan-fort-hood-trial-delays. 
272 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(b)(5)(B); United States v. Ohrt, 28 M.J. 301 
(C.M.A. 1989). This approach, which seems to reflect interests in the individual’s 
rehabilitation versus the command’s interests, clearly fits Packer’s due process model. 
The one thing the command might not want, because it could adversely affect good order 
and discipline, is for a convicted servicemember to return to the unit. As a practical 
matter, if a servicemember did not receive a punitive discharge, the command would 
have the option of administratively separating that person. See also PACKER, supra note 
154, at 53–58 (discussing rehabilitation as a justification for punishment). 
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sentence.273 In sentencing an accused, the court-martial or the military 
judge may consider not only the impact of the accused’s actions on the 
military community and any victims, but also the rehabilitative potential 
of the accused.274 To that extent, military sentencing reflects the due 
process-justice model.  
 
Furthermore, Rule for Court-Martial 1001, which governs 
presentencing procedures,275 is broadly asymmetrical in favor of the 
defense.  The Government is generally limited to evidence in aggravation 
of the crimes of which the accused was convicted, plus evidence of prior 
convictions and punishments, uncharged misconduct, information about 
the victim, and a very limited form of testimony about the accused’s 
rehabilitative potential.276  The Government is also bound by the Military 
Rules of Evidence.277  The defense, in contrast, is allowed to introduce 
nearly anything about the accused himself (as well as the crimes) that 
may tend to reduce the punishment.  The defense also has the option to 
relax the rules of evidence,278 and if the convicted servicemember 
chooses to make an unsworn statement, he is not only not subject to 
cross-examination,279 but his “allocution” rights allow him to speak about 
almost anything he wishes to try to influence his sentence.280  
 
Once the accused has been sentenced, a commander may not 
increase the punishment.281 The commander may, however, take action to 
reduce282 or suspend the sentence.283 
 
 
  
                                                 
273 See, e.g., United States v. Motsinger, 34 M.J. 255 (C.M.A. 1992). 
274 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(b)(5). 
275 Id. R.C.M. 1001. 
276 Id. R.C.M. 1001(b)(5); see also Edward J. O’Brien, Rehabilitative Potential 
Evidence—Theory and Practice, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2011, at 5, 11 & n.58 (calling into 
question whether the “rehabilitative potential” evidence the Government may introduce is 
ever really useful in enhancing a sentence). 
277 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(c)(3), (d), and (3). See also MCM, supra note 17, 
MIL. R. EVID. 1101. 
278 Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(3). If the judge has relaxed the rules of evidence for the defense, 
the prosecution may request that the rules of evidence be relaxed for any rebuttal 
evidence. Id. 
279 Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(C). 
280 Id. R.C.M. 1001(c)(2). 
281 Id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1). 
282 Id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1). 
283 Id. R.C.M. 1108. 
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j. Appellate Review of Court-Martial Convictions 
 
Finally, the one feature of the military justice system that perhaps 
best reflects the due process-justice model is the system’s appellate 
review of courts-martial.284 The system of appellate review is sometimes 
described as “paternalistic,” a reference to the view that the crime 
control-discipline model may lead to incorrect results (at the command 
level) and that the appellate courts can correct such results.  
 
As noted in Part II.C, above, court-martial convictions can be 
appealed to the relevant service’s Court of Criminal Appeals,285 and 
review by that court is automatic in certain cases.286 An adverse decision 
by those courts may be reviewed by the CAAF.287 And that court’s 
decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.288 
This system ensures that whatever may have occurred at the command 
level, appellate courts (both military and civilian) can review a court-
martial conviction to ensure that the conviction comports with the 
Constitution, the UCMJ, and the MCM.  
 
Within that structure are sub-elements that further the due process-
justice model. First, the accused is entitled to representation by a military 
appellate attorney at no cost to the accused.289 Second, the service 
appellate courts have independent fact-finding powers which provide a 
convicted servicemember with an opportunity to argue that the 
conviction should be set aside because the evidence was insufficient.290 
Occasionally a court-martial conviction is reversed on those grounds.291  
 
Third, in reviewing court-martial convictions, the appellate courts 
apply standards of review similar to those used in civilian courts.292 
Fourth, the service appellate courts have the power to review and, if 
                                                 
284 See generally Daniel T. Ghent, Military Appellate Process, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125 
(1971) (reviewing the military appellate process). 
285 UCMJ art. 66(a) (2012). The Judge Advocate General of each service must establish a 
Court of Criminal Appeals. 
286 A case must be referred to the service’s court of criminal appeals if the sentence 
includes death, a punitive discharge, or confinement of one year or more.  Id. art. 66(b).   
287 Id. art. 67. 
288 Id. art. 67 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012).  
289 UCMJ art. 70 (2012). 
290 Id. art. 66(c) (2012); MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1203(b) discussion.  
291 See, e.g., United States v. McDuffie, 65 M.J. 631 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2007) 
(evidence insufficient to sustain conviction). 
292 See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 17-14, at 1166–75 (discussing standards of review). 
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necessary, to reassess the sentence.293 In doing so, they may consider 
sentences adjudged in similar cases.294 Fifth, the appellate courts may 
return the case to the trial level for a hearing on a specified issue.295 And 
finally, the CAAF has used its review powers to conclude that a 
particular statute or provision is not enforceable.296 
 
 
3. Summary of Application of the Models 
 
While application of the crime control-discipline model and the due 
process-justice model to features of the military justice system is 
instructive, there seems to be no way to objectively determine how the 
two models fit together, or relate to each other. And one cannot simply 
add up the features that appear to reflect each model and come to a 
conclusion about whether one or the other predominates. At the most, 
they can provide some insight into how courts and commentators view 
one or more features of the system. In themselves they do not resolve the 
conundrum. 
 
 
VI. The Primary Purpose Approach to the Conundrum 
 
While the thematic approach297 and the models approach298 help in 
identifying the competing ideologies and approaches to the conundrum, 
neither approach provides a satisfactory answer to the core question: 
What is the primary purpose of the military justice system?  The answer 
usually depends on one’s ideological approach to the purposes of any 
criminal justice system. The models approach identifies and explores the 
different ideologies. The thematic approach reflects the writer’s “sound 
bite” views on those ideologies. 
 
                                                 
293 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1203(b) Discussion. 
294 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 15 M.J. 948 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983) (in some cases 
comparing sentences is appropriate); Cf. Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Stone Weber, 
Sentence Appropriateness Relief in the Courts of Criminal Appeals, 66 A.F. LAW. REV. 79 
(2010) (suggesting that comparing sentences leads to inconsistent results). 
295 United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1967). See also Andrew Effron, 
United States v. Dubay and the Evolution of Military Law, 207 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(discussing the history and application of DuBay hearings). 
296 See generally Cooke, supra note 112 (analyzing the shift in balance of power from the 
military commanders to the judges and lawyers). 
297 See Part IV, supra. 
298 See Part V, supra. 
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But the question remains. What is the primary purpose of the 
military justice system? The answer lies in part in an objective analysis 
of the history and development of military justice. Historically, starting 
with the Articles of War, the system was treated as a way to permit the 
commander to exercise his powers to provide good order and discipline 
in his unit.299  Through the decades the Articles of War were amended to 
reflect concern about the extent of that power and abuses in exercising 
that power. But the charter for the military justice system, if you will, 
remained. The system was established and retained for the primary 
purpose of discipline. The fact that Congress has placed limits on the 
commander’s discretion does not change the ultimate purpose and 
function of the system. 
 
When Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, it created a unified 
military justice system, which reaffirmed the commander’s power and 
authority to enforce good order and discipline. For example, the 
commander’s authority to impose nonjudicial punishment was 
reaffirmed.300 The UCMJ included new provisions that addressed 
concerns about abuse of those powers—limits which we now consider to 
be due process, or justice, protections. Those provisions—though they 
inured to the benefit of persons accused of crimes—did not negate or 
diminish the primary purpose of military justice. 
 
In the succeeding decades Congress has tweaked the UCMJ, for 
example by providing for Supreme Court review of court-martial 
convictions. But it has not in way signaled a change in the basic, 
primary, purpose of the Code. The fact that some functions which were 
originally assigned to a commander are now assigned to lawyers or 
judges301 does not alter the primary function of military justice:  
promoting good order and discipline.  
 
                                                 
299 See generally EDWARD M. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 1 (2d ed. 1976) (“Military justice 
must, of necessity, promote good order, high morale, and discipline.”); WINTHROP, supra 
note 14, at 21 (noting that preamble to 1775 Articles of War stated that Articles of War 
were intended for the “due order and regulating of the military”); Ferris, supra note 8, at 
446 (stating the primary purpose was to regulate military conduct of servicemen). In his 
treatise, Colonel Winthrop included a listing of other statutes under the heading, “Other 
Statutory Enactments Relating to the Discipline of the Army.” WINTHROP, supra note 14, 
at 24. 
300 See Part V.E.1.e, supra. 
301 See generally Cooke, supra note 112 (analyzing the shift in balance of power from the 
military commanders to the judges and lawyers). 
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The preamble to the current MCM incorrectly signals to the casual 
reader that the first purpose of the military justice system is to provide 
justice and the secondary purpose is to promote good order and 
discipline.302 The order of the list of purposes is a threat to the true 
primary purpose because it can be used by those espousing a stronger 
justice model to justify additional limits on the commander’s powers—or 
even divesting the commander of essential powers and responsibilities 
needed to insure good order and discipline.  
 
And focusing primarily on the justice component could be used to 
justify transferring powers traditionally held by the commander to a 
civilian prosecutor. The current military justice system reflects the 
principle that the commander is responsible for fighting and winning 
wars—a view expressed by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. 
Toth v. Quarles.303 Thus, the commander should have the power to 
maintain good order and discipline through the military justice system. 
The commander should not have to depend on a civilian justice system to 
enforce good order and discipline.304 
                                                 
302 MCM, supra note 17, pmbl. 
303 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
304 The use of civilian prosecutors was recently addressed in the Appeals Chamber 
decision in Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina & Mladan Markač. Gotovina and Markač had 
been tried and convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fomer 
Yugoslavia.  In overturning their convictions, the Appeals Chamber considered whether 
Markač, as commander of the Special Police during Operation Storm in the 1990s, could 
be held liable for crimes committed by them.  The court observed: 
 
Turning first to superior responsibility, the Appeals Chamber notes 
that the Trial Chamber did not explicitly find that Markač possessed 
effective control over the Special Police. The Trial Chamber noted 
evidence indicative of a superior-subordinate relationship and found 
that commanders of relevant Special Police units were subordinated 
to Markač. However, the Trial Chamber was unclear about the 
parameters of Markač’s power to discipline Special Police members, 
noting that he could make requests and referrals, but that “crimes 
committed by members of the Special Police fell under the 
jurisdiction of State Prosecutors.”  
 
Prosecutor v. Gotovina & Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeal Judgment ¶ 148 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012) (citations omitted, emphasis 
added).  In effect, Markač was exonerated in part because he lacked the power to 
discipline those under his command. He had to depend on civilian authorities to enforce 
the discipline in his command. For further discussion of this decision, see Gary D. Solis, 
The Gotovina Acquittal: A Sound Appellate Course Correction, 215 MIL. L. REV. 78 
(2013). 
74                  MILITARY LAW REVIEW         [Vol. 215 
 
If the primary purpose and function of the military justice system is 
to promote good order and discipline, then what of the “justice” or “due 
process” element?  The answer lies in recognizing the difference in laws 
that authorize or grant powers, and those that serve as limitations on the 
exercise of that power. The thrust of the Code—as of the Articles of 
War—is to recognize the commander’s authority to exercise good order 
and discipline.  Provisions in the Code, the MCM, service regulations, 
and case law provide checks on the commander’s exercise of that 
authority. But those “justice” checks do not change the primary purpose 
and function of the system. 
 
 
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Applied together, the thematic approach, the models approach, and 
the primary purpose approach summarize the relationship between the 
“discipline” and “justice” elements as follows: 
 
 First, the primary purpose of the military justice system is to 
enable commanders to enforce good order and discipline in 
their units. 
 
 Second, the military justice system imposes due process 
protections on the exercise of those powers by the 
commander, the prosecutor, the court-martial, and the 
appellate courts reviewing a court-martial. 
 
 Third, the due process limitations—although critical to any 
criminal justice system—must not overwhelm the primary 
purpose of military justice. 
 
Using those principles, I offer two recommendations for addressing 
the conundrum: First, developing a template to apply the foregoing 
principles and second, amending the UCMJ and the MCM to reflect those 
principles. 
 
The tensions evident in the conundrum will appear any time there is 
a proposal to amend the UCMJ or the MCM. In finding the right balance 
and combination of the two elements, the policy makers and those 
charged with considering changes or amendments to the military justice 
system must follow some sort of principled template.  A helpful starting 
point in looking for a principled template is the approach the Supreme 
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Court used in deciding how much procedural due process is due to a 
person who is threatened with a deprivation of life, liberty or property. In 
Matthews v. Eldridge,305 the Court provided a three-pronged balancing 
test: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through procedures used, 
and the probative value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved, 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirements would 
entail.306  
 
In United States v. Weiss,307 the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether the military accused had been denied due process because the 
military judge did not have a fixed term of office. The accused argued 
that the Court should apply the three-pronged Matthews test. The 
government argued that the Court should apply the test adopted by the 
Court in Medina v. United States.308 The Court rejected both arguments, 
stating that those tests were inapplicable in the military context. The test, 
said the Court, was set out in Middendorf v. Henry309: The question is 
whether the factors militating in favor of a particular right are so 
extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by 
Congress.310  
 
                                                 
305 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
306 Id. at 335. 
307 510 U.S. 163 (1994). 
308 505 U.S. 437 (1992). In Medina, the defendant had argued that the Court should apply 
the Matthews test in the context of a challenge to a state procedural law which placed the 
burden of showing incompetency on the defendant. The Court said that the Matthews test 
should be limited to civil cases and that the appropriate test for criminal cases was 
whether “the [rule in question] offends some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id. at 445. The 
Court noted that the Bill of Rights provide explicit guidance for criminal procedure rules 
and that expansion of those guarantees under the Due Process Clause would “invite 
undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance 
that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order.” Id. at 443. The Court assumed 
that the states would decide how best to adjust their procedural rules. 
309 425 U.S. 25 (1976). 
310 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177. 
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This approach, however, assumes that Congress has applied some 
sort of test or template in crafting the UCMJ and in considering any 
subsequent amendments. Thus, the Court left to Congress the task of 
addressing the conundrum and deciding how to balance the military’s 
interest in good order and discipline and the rights of a servicemember to 
due process of law.  Congress, in Article 36 of the UCMJ, authorized the 
President to formulate policies and procedures for implementing the 
UCMJ. In considering changes to the military justice system the policy 
makers—whether in Congress, the White House, or in the Department of 
Defense—should consider the following questions. 
 
 First, what military interests, e.g., good order and 
discipline, will be furthered by the provision in the 
UCMJ, the Manual, or the regulation?311  
 
 Second, what benefits, if any, will the provision provide 
to the servicemember?312 
 
 Third, what burdens, if any, will the provision place on 
the military justice system?313 
                                                 
311 The attention of those suggesting reforms or changes almost always focuses on 
expanding the rights of an accused. But in reality, there have been changes to the UCMJ 
over the years that recognized the need of commanders to maintain good order and 
discipline by expanding jurisdiction, see Part V.E.1.b, supra. The same is true for 
changes to the MCM. For example, the Military Justice Act of 1983 and the 1984 version 
of the Manual simplified greatly the requirements for preparing legal post-trial 
recommendations. Those reviews could properly be included in those features of the 
military justice system that protected the accused; but they consumed a great deal of time 
and were a constant source of problems, which resulted in many courts-martial records 
being returned to the trial level for corrective action.  See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 
17-8(B)(2), at 1117 (discussing problems with post-trial recommendations).  The process 
was further streamlined in 2008 and 2010. Id. at 1120–21. 
312 This, in effect, is the flip side of the cost factor, listed above.  Consider the example of 
the changes in the MCM that resulted in greatly simplifying of post-trial 
recommendations. Arguably, the accused lost a chance to challenge the technical failures 
in the recommendation, but the government was able to reduce the amount of time and 
resources in preparing what had become a very complicated and detailed report. 
313 For example, in 2009, the Cox Commission recommended that all general and special 
courts-martial be reviewable by the service appellate courts, regardless of the sentence 
adjudged and that a servicemember could seek review at the Supreme Court, even if the 
Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces did not hear the case. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE COMM., CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION OF THE AM. BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MILITARY JUSTICE (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.128855.1292429643!/menu/standard/file/coxreport
.pdf. Those changes would certainly expand the due process rights of an accused. But it 
2013] MILITARY JUSTICE CONUNDRUM   77 
 
This model roughly approximates the Matthews v. Eldridge test. 
Although the Supreme Court has said that this test was inapplicable to its 
review of military justice provisions, it should still remain useful to those 
charged with considering changes to the military justice system.314 
Addressing these questions helps frame the policymaker’s approach to 
the conundrum—keeping in mind that the primary function of the 
military justice system is to promote good order and discipline. 
 
With regard to the second recommendation—to amend the UCMJ 
and the MCM to reflect the three principles stated above—Congress 
should add a clear statement of purpose to the Code. It could be included 
in Article 1 and generally follow the form used in the preamble to the 
MCM. 
 
In that regard, the Preamble to the MCM should be amended to put 
good order and discipline in first place, as the true primary purpose of 
military justice, but also recognize the need to provide due process of 
law to those accused of committing offenses in the Armed Forces: 
 
The purpose of military law is to assist in maintaining 
good order and discipline in the armed forces, to provide 
due process of law, to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby 
to strengthen the national security of the United 
States.315 
 
Changing the preamble and including similar language in the UCMJ 
would be a step in the right direction.  In doing so, Congress and the 
President have an opportunity to resolve the military justice conundrum. 
                                                                                                             
would result in additional costs of time, personnel, and financial resources. Given the 
Supreme Court’s record of granting full review in very few cases each year, those costs 
would be difficult to justify. The accused would still be able to seek collateral relief in the 
federal courts. 
314 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992) (O’Connor, J, concurring) (noting that 
“the balancing of equities that Mathews v. Eldridge outlines remains a useful guide in due 
process cases”. 
315 This proposal uses the term “due process” of law. Although the term can be 
ambiguous, it is preferable to the more ambiguous term, “justice.” 
